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Migrant remittances are an increasingly important type of international 
financial flow for providing both additional resources for development as well 
as consumption expenditures for poverty alleviation.  One geographical area 
where these flows are quite significant is in the CIS economies both in terms of 
their sheer size as well as their economic importance in providing a source of 
external finance for the recipient countries. Data on remittances generally, but 
especially in this region, are often of poor reliability due to the fact that these 
flows often move through unofficial and unmonitored channels.  Data for the 
CIS are limited in that several countries do not provide this information in their 
balance of payment statistics and in those that do, it is often only partially 
reported and poorly collected or estimated. In this paper the characteristics, 
trends, and importance of remittances in the CIS are discussed and a new 
approach for estimating remittance flows in the CIS is developed based upon a 
new set of financial data recently released by the Central Bank of Russia and 
unpublished data obtained from the central banks of Kazakhstan, Moldova and 
Ukraine.  
 
Empirical analysis of remittances has been hampered by the fact that 
these data are generally provided only as country totals and not provided on a 
bilateral basis. The lack of bilateral data has also meant that missing data from 
countries that do not provide this data cannot be obtained or derived from 
available data from other source or destination countries.  However, beginning 
in 2006, Russia began publishing data by recipient country on money transfers 
through identified companies and post offices; Russia also publishes data on 
remittances outflows by its three key components (workers compensation, 
current transfers, capital transfers) to both an aggregate for the CIS and non-
CIS economies. In this paper these two sets of data have been combined so as to 
allow an estimate of remittances by Russia to each of the other CIS. Since 
Russia is the major source country for remittances from many of the CIS, this 
has allowed an estimate of remittances to those countries that do not provide 
remittance data in their balance of payments statistics. Several different 
methodological procedures are proposed and a range of possible estimates is 
provided and the implications for these findings are discussed. The importance 
of these flows for providing a source of external finance is developed by 
comparing them to aid and capital inflows. Basically we find that the volume of 
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  1remittances especially for the central Asian CIS are much larger than 
commonly reported; for example our estimates for Tajikistan are over twice of 
what is officially reported. In addition remittances are calculated to be almost 
10 per cent of GDP for Uzbekistan, a country for which previously there were 
no prior estimates of this variable. In addition, Kazakhstan is another important 
destination for workers from central Asia, some estimates are provided for its 
bilateral remittances to these economies. After Russia, Moldova is the largest 
recipient of remittance inflows in the CIS; this paper provides new information 
on the bilateral sources of these flows. Although Russia is a major source of 
remittances for the other CIS, the previously unpublished data from 
Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Ukraine show that they receive significant, if not the 




Migrant remittances are an increasingly important type of international 
financial flow and for many countries they provide a significant source of external 
finance of a magnitude similar to or even larger than capital flows or aid. Numerous 
recent papers have attempted to describe the determinants and characteristics of these 
financial flows. Remittances to the developing and transition economies have been 
increasing quite rapidly and have more than doubled over the last decade and are 
estimated to be over $200 billion in 2006 by the World Bank (Ratha and Shaw, 2006) 
and over $300 billion by the UN International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD, 2007).  As recently as the mid-1990s, remittances to these economies were 
smaller than the three other main financial flows -- foreign direct investment, official 
development assistance (ODA), and private capital flows; however, remittances were 
significantly larger than either private capital flows and ODA during 1998-2003 and 
are currently still twice as large as ODA.
2  For a few countries, remittances are even 
greater than exports as a source of foreign exchange; this would be even more likely if 
exports were adjusted for their import component of assembled parts. In dynamic 
terms, remittances unlike FDI or other capital flows do not create a future obligation 
that implies a potential outflow of foreign exchange.  
 
Although remittances might be intuitively viewed as a positive factor for 
growth and/or poverty alleviation, there are those that have hypothesized that these 
flows may actually reduce growth (Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah, 2003; and 
Burgess and Haksar, 2005). There are any number of channels where by remittances 
might have a negative impact on development such as through Dutch disease 
appreciation effects,
3 a brain drain,
4 or reduced incentives for recipients to work. 
Likewise there are numerous channels through which migration and remittances could 
promote development in addition to the obvious benefit of additional external finance; 
these include improved education and health for the impoverished families receiving 
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most of the 1980s remittance flows to developing countries were greater than either official aid, FDI, or 
other non-FDI private capital inflows. Nevertheless the magnitude of remittances relative to developing 
countries’ GDPs has increased substantially from just slightly more than .5 per cent of GDP in the 
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of the source countries. 
  2them, improved job skills learned abroad, and increased commercial ties that could 
stimulate trade and investment (Herander and Saavedra, 2005). Broadly speaking, 
migrants reduce the information costs incurred in developing economic relations 
between countries. In cases where there is persistent unemployment, the loss of the 
labor resources may have very minor opportunity costs for the sending economy. 
Since remittances have been found to be less volatile than other sources of foreign 
exchange, they may reduce the chances of a financial or currency crisis. Remittances 
are generally large in countries that are considered to be a higher investment risk and 
have relatively poor access to international capital markets (as judged by low or non-
existent credit ratings).
5  By improving credit ratings, remittances contribute to a 
better investment climate and can thereby attract other financial inflows. Undoubtedly 
the degree to which remittances can promote development is dependent on 
complementary domestic economic policies which channel these flows into 
appropriate activities while also addressing their macroeconomic implications 
(McCormick and Wahba, 2000; Taylor, 2006; Ballard, 2003).  More recent 
econometric analysis has generally concluded that remittances have had no effect 
(IMF, 2005) or a positive and statistically significant impact on growth (Mansoor and 
Quillin, 2006; Ang, 2007) and/or poverty reduction (Adams and Page, 2003). 
 
Estimating the impact of remittances on other economic variables such as 
growth and poverty is complicated by the statistical problem of endogeneity since 
during periods of low growth or high poverty more people may emigrate or those 
already outside may send more assistance home. Thus empirically, large remittances 
may be associated with economic distress. In fact, this positive response of 
remittances to periods of economic distress is often cited as one of the important 
benefits of these flows as they counter pro-cyclical capital movements. In addition, 
several important channels such as increased education or health spending would only 
affect growth after a very long lag and would therefore not show up in standard cross-
country growth regressions as they are typically performed. The degree to which 
emigration and remittances can reduce poverty is dependent to a significant degree on 
the skill composition of the migrants. Although migrants appear to come from the 
higher skilled groups and from those with extra motivation and energy, it is still the 
case that remittances appear to increase education and health spending in those 
households that receive them. In addition, the poor may benefit from the increased job 
opportunities that are opened up when the more skilled leave; although this effect may 
be weakened if skilled and unskilled labor are complementary instead of substitute 
factors. Generally, given the statistical problems involved, the positive impacts of 
remittances are more apparent in micro household studies than in cross-country 
analysis. Remittances have also been alleged to be a significant factor in local housing 
markets (i.e., Armenia) and are often correlated with construction activity (IMF, 
2005) or price movements (Palacin and Shelburne, 2005).  Overall, the economic 
implications of remittances in regard to a country’s inequality, macroeconomic 
performance, and money supply are not well understood and require additional 
research.  
 
  On a global basis according to balance of payments statistics, remittances are 
estimated to have been approximately $262.5 billion in 2005 ($232.7 billion in 2004) 
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  3based upon reported inflows; less attention seems to be used to calculate outflows as 
their world total in 2005 was reported as $178.7 billion ($163.3 billion in 2004) 
(World Bank-RD, 2007). Thus remittance data are similar to trade data where on a 
worldwide basis total imports significantly exceed total exports; generally countries 
appear to exert more scrutiny of economic inflows than of outflows. Inflows appear to 
go primarily to developing countries as their total for 2005 is reported at $192.9 
billion or 73.5 per cent; however, developing countries account for only $38.2 billion 
or 21.4 per cent of outflows. 
     
One geographical area where remittance flows are quite significant is in the 
CIS economies
6 both in terms of their sheer size as well as their economic importance 
in providing a source of external finance for the recipient countries. An assessment of 
the impacts of remittances on the economic performance of the CIS economies, 
however, is significantly hampered by either limited data or data of poor reliability. 
Data on remittances are generally difficult to obtain due to the fact that these are 
private flows that often move through unofficial and unmonitored channels. In some 
cases such as Georgia, remittances are subject to income taxes and thus there is an 
obvious incentive in concealing these flows (Martinez, 2005). Also since Russia taxes 
migrants (those working over a year) at the flat rate of 13 per cent and seasonal 
workers at 30 per cent, there is an obvious incentive for migrants to remain 
undocumented and avoid official money transfer services which could potentially 
report them to the Russian authorities.
7 The importance of tax avoidance is 
demonstrated by increase in recorded remittances inflows to Tajikistan from $4 
million in 2002QI to $56 million in 2004QI after the elimination of a 30 per cent tax 
on remittance transfers.  
 
Several CIS economies do not provide estimates of remittances in their 
balance of payments statistics, and even in cases where the government reports 
remittance flows, there is a general sense that the official statistics grossly 
underestimate the true magnitude of the flows; this is especially the case for the 
central Asian CIS. As such, researchers have begun to develop some alternative 
methodologies for estimating the size of these flows. In this paper, a new approach to 
estimating remittances in the CIS is developed using new data on financial flows 
which has recently been published by the Central Bank of Russia and unpublished 
data obtained from Kazakhstan, Moldova and Ukraine. Section II discusses the 
availability of remittances data and the various definitions of remittances that are used 
as well as outlining some of the procedures that are used in making calculations of 
their values. In section III the available data on remittances within the CIS and their 
general magnitude are discussed. In section IV two new data series recently released 
by the Central Bank of Russia are described and their possible relationship to 
remittances are explored. Similar, but previously unpublished data from Kazakhstan 
and Moldova are also examined; and previously unpublished data on bilateral 
remittances obtained from Ukraine are also analyzed. Section V provides a range of 
                                                 
6 The regional grouping Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is used to refer to the 12 former 
members of the Soviet Union (which does not include the three Baltic states) and does not explicitly 
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  4new estimates of remittances based upon these datasets while section VI provides a 
discussion of the implications of these results and a summary of the findings.     
 
II. Remittances Definitions and Data 
 
Remittances are generally defined as the sum of three entries in the standard 
presentation of the balance of payments, these are: 1) workers’ compensation under 
the income account (of the current account) which includes income earned abroad by 
seasonal or short-term workers (foreign residents for less than a year), 2) workers’ 
remittances under the current transfers (of the current account) which includes income 
earned abroad by migrants (foreign residents for over a year) and sent home, and 3) 
migrants’ transfers under the capital transfers account (of the capital account) which 
includes the repatriation of financial assets when migrants return home.
8 Generally, 
individual transactions or transfers of this type are not officially recorded (as items 
such as imports) and must be estimated by various means. The inclusion of 
compensation of employees (working abroad) in remittances makes sense from a 
strict balance of payments sense where transactions are recorded between domestic
9 
and foreign residents since domestic workers temporarily working abroad are still 
considered as domestic residents and thus their wages earned in the foreign country 
represent a payment from a foreign resident to a domestic one. However, in terms of 
some issues such as providing foreign exchange for the home country, the values for 
official remittances overstate the contribution of this factor since some of that income 
is used to purchase items, especially food and rent, in the foreign location. Survey 
estimates using workers in Russia from Tajikistan find that approximately one-half of 




Of these three components, worker remittances are by far the largest 
component accounting for well over one-half of total remittances; compensation of 
employees accounts for approximately another third while migrant transfers are 
relatively small. This, of course varies by country and year; for example the 
percentage breakdown by category in the outflows from Russia in 2006 were 52.8, 
40.1 and 7.1 per cent respectively. Tables 1 and 2 provide the breakdown of 
remittances data for the CIS into these components for both inflows and outflows. 
 
Obtaining data on remittances is not straightforward in that only a portion of 
the flows actually goes through some official financial channel or requires some other 
type of official report. Many of the migrant workers are illegal and thus do not report 
their earned income to their host country nor most probably to their home country for 
tax purposes. When the income in transferred back to their home countries, it may be 
recorded if the transfer goes through a bank or wire service, however often the money 
                                                 
8 These are IMF balance of payments standard presentation codes 2310, 2391, and 2431 respectively 
for inflows (credits), and 3310, 3391, and 3431 for outflows (debits). 
9 In this paper the term domestic refers to the home or source country of the worker and the term 
foreign refers to the destination country in which he has moved to work. In terms of remittances, the 
source country is the foreign country (where the migrant works) and the destination (where the 
remittances are sent to) is the home country.  
10 Those goods that are consumed in the foreign location of work should ideally be included as imports 
in the domestic country’s balance of payments, but this is not commonly estimated and included in 
official import statistics. In addition, taxes paid to the foreign government may also not be properly 
accounted for. 
  5is carried by the person, friends or transport workers like bus drivers or even sent 
through the mail in letters. Physically sending or carrying the cash is especially used 
by illegal migrants to avoid having to fill out any documents, those poorly educated 
and unskilled who are especially unfamiliar with banking and money transfer 




IMF Balance of Payments Remittance Inflows for the CIS by Component, 2005-2006 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
2005  2006 
  Remittances  Compensation  Transfers  Total  Remittances  Compensation  Transfers  Total  
Armenia ........................................... 47  337  11  395  65  432  8  505 
Azerbaijan ....................................... 490  133  70  693  662  128  22  812 
Belarus ............................................ 235  135  370  173  161  334 
Georgia ........................................... 94  247  5  346  153  315  17  485 
Kazakhstan ..................................... 56  6  116  178  73  11  104  188 
Kyrgyzstan ...................................... 313  9   322       
Republic of Moldova ....................... 395  520  3  918  603  573  6  1,182 
Russian Federation ........................ 820  1,714  583  3,117  983  1,647  678  3,308 
Tajikistan ......................................... 465  1  466  1,015  4  1,019 
Turkmenistan...................................            
Ukraine ............................................ 237  359  .2  596  290  540  .1  830 
Uzbekistan ......................................             
CIS Total.......................................... 2,916  3,552  932  7,400  3,554  3,283  996  8,663 




IMF Balance of Payments Remittance Outflows for the CIS by Component, 2005-2006 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
2005  2006 
  Remittances  Compensation  Transfers  Total  Remittances  Compensation  Transfers  Total  
Armenia .............................................. 14  129  3  146  19  126  4  149 
Azerbaijan .......................................... 127  112  29  268  149  125  26  300 
Belarus ...............................................   94  94  3   90  93 
Georgia .............................................. 8  18  3  29  4  19  1  24 
Kazakhstan ........................................ 1,158  735  107  2,000  2,000  962  75  3,037 
Kyrgyzstan ......................................... 33  17  72  122       
Republic of Moldova .......................... 5  43  22  70  6  50  29  85 
Russian Federation ........................... 3,051  2,921  1,017  6,989  4,587  6,038  813  11,438 
Tajikistan ............................................ 144  1  145  393  2  395 
Turkmenistan......................................            
Ukraine ............................................... 2  10  22  34  2  10  20  32 
Uzbekistan .........................................              
CIS Total............................................. 4,542  3,986  1,369  9,897  7,158  7,325  1,038  15,553 




The availability, speed, reliability and transaction costs are thought to be the 
major considerations in determining which method is used to transfer funds. Within 
the CIS the most popular mechanism currently seems to be through money wire 
services such as Western Union. The fees are generally low amounting to only a few 
percentage points, there are usually several currency options, and the transfer is quick 
  6with the funds available in a day or two.
11 Transfers through the banking system are 
generally more expensive and many migrants do not have bank accounts where they 
work nor do their families back home. Nevertheless, remittances are increasingly 
moving through official banking channels as the financial systems in these economies 
develop and as residents’ confidence in the banking system is restored after falling 
during the banking system collapse following the 1998 Russian financial crisis. There 
is some evidence that remittances have been used by some banks in recipient 
countries to build a customer base.
12
  The transfer of remittances allows banks to 
gather information about their customers, which in turn facilitates cross-selling of 
other financial products. Overall, a well-functioning banking system encourages 
remittances; however in the CIS financial depth is low and capital markets are not 
well developed. Cash transfers carried across borders by friends or relatives or sent 
through the mail are probably the cheapest method but they entail higher security 
risks.   
 
A major difficulty in analyzing remittances within the CIS is that several of 
the countries do not provide remittances data (primarily due to the difficulties in 
obtaining this data), or if they do it is only partial in that it covers only one or two of 
the official components, or the estimates appear to be unreliable given other known 
information about the size of population flows, etc. More specifically, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan do not provide balance of payments data consistent with IMF 
methodological procedures and their balance of payments (BOP) data do not appear in 
the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics series nor do they provide remittances data 
on their web sites or in other official documents. Belarus does not provide data on the 
workers’ remittances component, the Kyrgyz Republic does not provide data on the 
compensation of employees component (for inflows), and Tajikistan and Ukraine do 
not, in general, provide data on the migrants’ transfers component. In addition, worker 
remittances as reported by Tajikistan include only those that go through official 
channels (World Bank, 2006). The overall reliability of much of the data from most of 
these countries is probably quite low.  More generally, however, these are not 
problems associated only with the CIS; the majority of central banks in the 
developing countries do not provide reliable estimates of remittances (Martinez, 
2005).  
 
Generally with trade data for instance, if a given country does not provide 
data, it is possible to estimate that missing data from the trade statistics of its trading 
partners. However, this procedure requires that the data be provided on a bilateral 
basis and official remittance data are generally not provided on a bilateral basis. For 
example none of the CIS economies publishes remittances data on a bilateral basis.  
The degree to which it is calculated but unpublished on a bilateral basis is generally 
not made explicit in documentation provided by central banks concerning their 
statistical methodology. This is typical not just for the CIS but for most economies. 
For example, an IMF request to see if there was any bilateral remittance data to 33 
                                                 
11 A study of the costs of sending funds from the U.S. to a number of the CIS including Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Russia found that it was similar to sending funds to other developing 
countries (Martinez, 2005). However, Ratha and Shaw (2006) calculate the costs of sending $200 to be 
rather high at 9.4 per cent from Kiev to Moscow and 4.3 per cent from Moscow to Kiev.  
12 A study of workers’ remittances in Armenia shows that official channels are more widely used in 
transactions originating from Russia than from western Europe, due to much lower transaction costs, as 
banks have specifically targeted this type of business (Roberts and Banian, 2005).  
  7developing countries yielded data form only 11. However, three of those providing 
bilateral information were from the CIS -- Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Tajikistan.  In 
addition, officially published Russian and Ukrainian statistics provide a breakdown 
between remittances to and from two country aggregates – the CIS and non-CIS 
countries. Thus the general absence of published bilateral remittance data eliminates 
the possibility of obtaining any missing data from another country or double-checking 
available data.    
 
Although bilateral remittance data are generally unavailable, it has been found, 
using that bilateral data that were collected for the above mentioned IMF study, that 
remittance flows can be reasonably modelled using a gravity model framework (Lueth 
and Ruiz-Arranz, 2006). Empirically, it is found that flows are larger between larger 
countries and become smaller as distance increases. In addition, that study found that 
flows are larger as the source country (of remittances) becomes richer and the 
destination country becomes poorer.
13 Given the fairly close association alleged to 
exist between migration levels and remittances (as discussed in section III), and the 
fact that migration flows have also been shown to be consistent with the gravity 
model framework (Peridy, 2006), it would appear likely that remittances would also 
be consistent with the gravity model framework.  
 
The need to improve remittances data is widely recognized. The G7 Finance 
Ministers established an international working group led by the World Bank, and the 
UN Statistics Division has a Technical Sub-Group on the Movement of Natural 
Persons which are examining these issues.  The general conclusion of these groups 
has so far been that transfers should be defined in terms of residence and thus should 
be described as personal transfers instead of workers or migrant transfers. A so-called 
Luxembourg Group has been set up to examine compilation methods and this group 
has so far concluded that numerous data sources need to be incorporated into 
remittances calculations. In addition, they found that household surveys and 
modelling approaches may also be useful with the optimal use of these different 
techniques being dependent on individual country circumstances. A number of the 
CIS, including Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, and Russia have recently implemented 
procedures or surveys to improve the reporting of remittances. More specifically, 
Belarus has been examining ways to measure remittances sent through relatives or in 
letters, Moldova conducted a household survey on remittances in September-October 
2004, and Russia has revised the reporting requirements of banking institutions 
(Martinez, 2005).  In addition to more accurately collecting remittance data, there is a 
need for standardizing the definition of remittances. For example, should mortgage 
loans taken out in a country where a migrant works and invested back home in real 
estate be considered as a remittance? If this type of flow is included, then one of the 
major advantages of remittances, that is of not producing a future obligation, would 
no longer apply.      
 
III. Remittance Flows in the CIS 
 
Of the $301 billion of remittance flows to the developing world estimated by 
the IFAD in 2006, over a fifth (22 per cent) of these are estimated to flow to former 
                                                 
13 Our summary of their results is based upon the discussion in their text, although this does not match 
the results presented in their Table 4; we assume the latter is mislabelled.  
  8transition economies, and almost $40 billion or 13 per cent to the CIS economies. The 
IFAD use a variety of data sources to estimate remittance flows including such things 
as population surveys. However, using balance of payments statistics as the data 
source, the CIS received inflows of slightly less than $10 billion in 2006 which equals 
5 per cent of flows to the developing countries. Thus the IFAD estimate of $40 billion 
is four times as large as that estimated from balance of payments statistics. As these 
figures show and as will be further developed in this paper, there is significant 
uncertainty about the size of remittances, especially in the CIS, and estimates often 
vary by a magnitude of several times. However, regardless of data sources, these 
inflows are quite large for some of the CIS, especially relative to their GDPs and in 
fact estimated Moldovian inflows of almost $1 billion (similar for both data sources) 
are equal to over 31 per cent of their GDP, the highest for any economy.  In addition, 
the growth of remittance inflows over 2001-2006 into the transition economies has 
been faster than to any other aggregate region and the growth of remittances to the 
CIS (264 per cent) has been even faster than to the transition economies as a group.      
 
Workers migrate for employment purposes in order to obtain jobs when none 
are available at home or to obtain better wages. Given that the per capita income of 
Russia is significantly above that of the other CIS, and given the historical and 
language factors, it is no surprise that Russia is the primary source for remittances in 
the CIS. Total remittance inflows (received) to the CIS-11 covering 1995-2006 as 
recorded in their balance of payments statistics are provided in table 3 while outflows 
(payments) are given in table 4. As explained in the previous section there are a 
number of missing values and some of the reported values below are calculated from 
only one or two of the three basic components of remittances. Between 2000-2006 
remittance inflows into the CIS-11 have increased at an annual rate of over 36 per 
cent, while outflows (2000-2006) have increased at an annual rate of 34 per cent. 
Remittances to and from Russia covering 1995-2006 are provided in table 5 broken 
down into the three primary components (Russia does not provide data on remittance 
transfers from long-term migrants for 1995-2000) which are then further separated 
into flows with the world and those with the CIS-11. The overall trends in Russian 




CIS-11 Remittance Inflows 1995-2006 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Armenia ............................... 65 84  136 92  95  87  94  131  168 336 395  505 
Azerbaijan ........................... 3 0 0 6  54  57  104  181  171 228 693  813 
Belarus ................................ 29 351 295 315  193  139  149  141  222 256 370  334 
Georgia ...............................    284  373  361  274  181  230  236 303 346  485 
Kazakhstan ......................... 116 89 60 72  64  122  171  205  148 166 178  187 
Kyrgyzstan .......................... 1 2 3  25  18  9  11  37  78 189 322  450 
Republic of Moldova ........... 1 87  114  124  112  179  243  324  487 705 920  1,182 
Tajikistan .............................            79  146 252 467  1,019 
Turkmenistan.......................                   
Ukraine ................................  6  12  12  18  33  141  209  330 411 595  830 
Uzbekistan ..........................                   
CIS Total............................. 215 619 904  1,020  915  900  1,094  1,537  1,986 2,846 4,286  5,805 
Source:  World Bank Remittance Database; shaded cells are estimates based upon the growth rate of remittances in those that have reported. 
  9 
Table 4 
CIS-11 Remittance Outflows 1995-2006 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Armenia ...............................  17  5  3  8  5  21  24  27 127 146  148 
Azerbaijan ........................... 9 15 19 30  77  101  142  235  169 200 269  301 
Belarus ................................ 12 192 141 111  76  58  77  68  65 81 94  93 
Georgia ...............................    6  5  39  39  26  26  29 26 29  24 
Kazakhstan ......................... 503 423 522 471  356  440  487  594  802 1,354 2,000  3,036 
Kyrgyzstan .......................... 32 33 29 50  51  45  54  57  55 82  122  122 
Republic of Moldova ...........  6  20  24  25  46  59  57  67 67 68  86 
Tajikistan .............................            13  64 119 145  395 
Turkmenistan.......................                   
Ukraine ................................  1 4 3  3  10  5  15  29 20 34  32 
Uzbekistan ..........................                   
CIS Total............................. 556 687 746 697  635  744  871  1,089  1,307 2,076 2,907   
Source:  World Bank Remittance Database 
 
Table 5 
Russian Remittances 1995-2006 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Received   (Inflows)        
  Compensation       World  166  102  227  301  425  500  624  704  814  1,206  1,714  1,647 
                                  CIS  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  4  6  7 
  Capital  Transfers  World  2,336  2,668  2,041  1,624  865  775  416  423  339  364  583  678 
                                 CIS  2,036  2,660  1,982  1,578  836  752  399  371  277  294  496  576 
  Remittances          World              363  232  300  1,098  820  983 
                                 CIS              44  75  93  318  233  298 
  Total                     World  2,502  2,770  2,268  1,925  1,290  1,275  1,403  1,359  1,453  2,668  3,117  3,308 
                                CIS  2,036  2,660  1,983  1,578  836  752  443  446  370  616  735  881 
                                 % CIS  81.4  96.0  87.4  82.0  64.8  59.0  31.6  32.7  25.5  23.1  23.6  26.6 
                         
Payments   (Outflows)                         
  Compensation      World  469  507  568  465  204  232  493  507  958  1,464  2,921  6,038 
                                CIS  216  309  379  303  136  148  329  327  613  1,017  1,944  4,476 
                                 %CIS  46.1  60.9  66.7  65.2  66.7  63.8  66.7  64.5  64.0  69.4  66.6  74.1 
  Capital Transfers  World  3,469  3,529  2,934  2,086  1,204  867  908  931  969  1,,52  1,017  813 
                                CIS  2,259  1,840  1,471  946  437  297  261  238  245  231  260  291 
                                %CIS  65.1  52.1  50.1  45.3  36.3  34.3  28.7  25.5  25.3  22.0  25.5  35.7 
  Remittances         World         4 2 1   788  1,306  2,672  3,051  4,587 
                                CIS         2 4 6   485  805  2,103  2,475  4,101 
                                %CIS              58.5  61.5  61.6  78.7  81.1  89.4 
  Total                     World  3,938  4,036  3,502  2,551  1,408  1,099  1,822  2,226  3,233  5,188  6,989  11,438 
                               CIS  2,475  2,193  1,850  1,249  573  445  836  1,050  1,663  3,351  4,679  8,868 
                              %CIS  62.8  54.3  52.8  49.0  40.7  40.5  45.8  47.2  51.4  64.6  66.9  77.5 
Source:  Russian Central Bank. 
 
Remittances fell with the Russian currency crisis in the late 1990s but have 
increased since 2000.
14 The increase in Russian outflows has been especially rapid 
having increased at an annual rate of almost 48 per cent a year between 2000 and 
2006. The increase in total (world) Russian outflows to over $11 billion in 2006 is 
explained primarily by the rapid increase in outflows to the other CIS which increased 
at an annual rate of almost 65 per cent per year over 2000-2006. The CIS share of 
                                                 
14 This is counter to the general observation that remittances increase during periods of financial crises. 
For example they increased in Mexico after the Tequila crisis in 1994, in Indonesia and Thailand after 
the Asian crises of 1997-98 and in Argentina after its crisis in 2001although they fell significantly in 
Korea after the Asian crisis; in addition they have been found to increase after natural disasters such as 
hurricanes or earthquakes.  
  10Russian outflows fell each year between 1995 and 2000, but has increased each year 
since 2000; this share was below 50 per cent as recently as 2002 but is now over 
three-quarters. Total Russian inflows have increased much more slowly than outflows 
and are currently dominated primarily by inflows from outside the CIS. The CIS share 
of inflows has declined from 81 per cent in 1995 to 27 per cent in 2006; the 
introduction of the workers’ remittance component in 2001 only explains a small 
portion of this declining trend. Although the majority of Russian remittance outflows 
go to the CIS-11 (77.5 per cent in 2006), the majority of Russian remittance inflows 
come from outside the CIS-11 (73.3 per cent in 2006).  
 
Generally, remittances, like aid, primarily go in one direction, i.e., a country is 
either a remittee (destination country of financial flow) or a remitter (source country 
of financial flow). Russia, however stands out as somewhat unique in being both a 
major remitter (10
th  in the world in 2003) and a remittee (19
th in 2003). Nevertheless, 
overall outflows from Russia are much larger, and their relative size as been 
increasing through time as outflows have increased from 130 per cent of inflows in 
2001 to 346 per cent in 2006. Within the CIS, Russian outflows have increased from 
189 per cent of inflows in 2001 to 1,007 per cent in 2006. Thus, whether looking at 













































Source:  Russian Central Bank; 2007 estimate by the authors based upon the first half of 2007. 
 
In addition to the large migrant inflows into Russia, workers from central Asia 
are also going in significant numbers to Kazakhstan due to its closer location, less 
overt discrimination than in Russia, a more similar climate, and the similarity of the 
Kyrgyz and Uzbek language to Kazakh. In addition to the legal migrants, there are an 
estimated 400,000 illegal migrants (or 2.5 per cent of the population) in Kazakhstan 
today (Economist, 2007). Although immigration only recently began to exceed 
emigration, Kazakhstan has been primarily a remitter for some time as its emigrants 
have provided minimal remittances. All of the remaining CIS are on net mostly 
recipients of remittance flows. Unfortunately, besides Russia and Ukraine, none of the 
  11other CIS publishes remittances broken down into a CIS/non-CIS division so it is not 
possible to accurately determine what per cent of CIS-11 remittances come from 
countries outside the CIS. 
 
It is interesting to compare reported Russian remittance outflows to the CIS 
with reported CIS-11 remittance inflows. This is graphed in chart 2 using the data 
from tables 3 and 5. These two series track each other rather closely between 1998 
and 2005. CIS-11 inflows prior to 1998 would seem suspect given their often very 
small values. A number of the three subcomponents of remittances for several 
countries are missing values during these years; realistically these are missing values 
and not zeros as considered in the graph. Since some of the inflows into the CIS-11 
come from countries other than Russia, their reported inflows should be greater than 
Russian outflows to the CIS-11. Using data from 2005, CIS-11 total inflows (from 
table 3) were $4,286 while Russian outflows to the CIS-11 were $4,679; thus, since 
CIS-11 total inflows should at least equal Russian outflows to the CIS-11, there is at a 
minimum a $393 million discrepancy. This conclusion must qualified in that the CIS-
11 inflows data do not include Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan since they do not report 
this data. However, with the almost doubling (89.5 per cent increase) in reported 
Russian outflows to the CIS in 2006, and the significantly smaller increases in 
reported inflows by the CIS-11, this discrepancy increases to almost $3 billion in 
2006.  In section V an attempt is made to determine whether this is due to under-
reporting by those with official remittance data or if it can be reasonably accounted 
for by estimates of remittances to Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan. However, CIS 
inflows, once adjusted for these two countries, should not just match Russian outflows 
(to the CIS) but should exceed them since they include remittances from other 
countries as well.   
 
Chart 2 
Russian Outflows to the CIS-11Compared to CIS-11 Inflows, 1995-2006 







































Source:  Russian outflows from the Russian Central Bank; CIS inflows from table3. 
 
 
  12Total remittances from Russia to the CIS-11 have been increasingly dominated 
by the compensation of employees and workers’ remittances (current transfers) 
components. The remaining constituent of total remittances, capital transfers, which 
in 2001 represented almost one third of this total, accounted for just 3% in 2006. 
Capital remittances have remained relatively stable during that period on an absolute 
basis, without reflecting changes in migratory outflows to the CIS. In fact, the 
correlation between both series is negative. This is a somewhat surprising result, since 
the estimation of capital transfers is allegedly based of the number of migrants 
returning to their countries. This apparent discrepancy may be salvaged if we consider 
that only part of the reported migration outflows concern migrants permanently 
returning to their countries. In line with this interpretation, relatively constant capital 
transfer outflows would suggest that the number of migrants returning home 
permanently has remained roughly unchanged. Changes in outflows could be 




Capital Transfers due to Migrant Activity, Payments from Kazakhstan 
2001QI-2007Q3 











































































































































As share of paid remittances, %
 
Source:  National Bank of Kazakhstan 
 
Capital transfers remain, however, quite significant for remittance inflows into 
Russia from the CIS although they have fallen appreciably since the 1990s. The 
factors leading to the outward migration from central Asia and the Caucasus (back to 
Russia) have evolved over time. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, people moved 
to avoid the conflicts that arose in the newly created Former Soviet Union (FSU), and 
specific ethnic groups attempted to move back to the region of their heritage. 
Kazakhstan, where ethnic Russians accounted for almost half of the total population, 
lost over 3 million people (or almost 20 per cent of its population) due to emigration 
after 1989 (Schrooten, 2006). This type of migration is likely to have only a one-off 
impact on migrant remittances, as the newcomers repatriate their assets to their new 
  13country of residence. This return of ethnic Russians to their homeland resulted in 
significant capital transfers remittances paid to Russia; this factor has diminished over 
time. As an example, capital transfers as reported in the Kazakh balance of payments 
is provided in chart 3. Not only has the magnitude of capital transfers fallen since 
2001 but its share of total remittances paid fell from almost 75 per cent in 2001 to 
around 2 per cent in 2006. There is a very obvious seasonal pattern to these capital 
transfers as they peak in the summer and fall in the winter. The cause of this is less 
clear, but perhaps is due to the fact that people tend to move in the summer months 
due to better weather and the school calendar. In addition, once back in Russia, these 
families had few ties with their original country of residence and therefore, these 
immigrants were unlikely to send sizeable funds back to where they previously lived. 
 
More recently, economic considerations have dominated remittance flows 
within the CIS as living standards and wage levels vary tremendously amongst the 
FSU. Some economic data for variables likely to be important in explaining 
remittances are provided in table 6. For example, Russian per capita income is almost 
10 times that of Tajikistan while the wage that a Tajik can get in Russia is also close 
to ten times their local wage. Although the typical CIS worker may have less human 
capital than the typical Russian, there is some survey data which finds that the typical 
CIS migrant has higher human capital than the typical Russian. However, because 
many of the CIS migrants are not legal and not eligible for social assistance, they have 
lower reservation wages than domestic residents and therefore may end up getting 
paid less. Language difficulties and discrimination may also be significant in keeping 
migrant wages low. According to a 2005 survey, the typical Tajik migrant is a married 
34 year old male with secondary or vocational education who works approximately 14 























  2005  2005  2005  2000/05  2000/5  2006 
Armenia ............................................. 4,428  46.2  37.7  -3.0  -0.4 130.6 
Azerbaijan .......................................... 4,374  45.6  41.4  0.8  0.8 129.0 
Belarus ............................................... 6,906  72.1  72.3  -0.4  -0.5 135.0 
Georgia .............................................. 3,362  35.1  34.5  -1.0  -1.1 49.0 
Kazakhstan ........................................ 6,927  72.3  84.3  3.2  0.4 123.0 
Kyrgyzstan ......................................... 1,695  17.7  20.8  1.8  0.9 87.0 
Republic of Moldova ......................... 2,151  22.4  34.7  -2.7  -0.2 49.5 
Russia................................................. 9,584  100.0  100  0.9  -0.3 93.7 
Tajikistan ............................................ 1,134  11.8  9.6  3.9  2.1 60.5 
Turkmenistan..................................... 5,067  52.9     2.3  1.4 98.5 
Ukraine .............................................. 6,193  64.6  52.2  0.5  -0.8 64.3 
Uzbekistan ......................................... 1,790  18.7  23.0  2.6  1.5 137.8 
CIS  - 11 (excluding Russia)........... 4,636  48.4    1.1  0.2 88.8 
   Source:  UNECE Database  and calculations by authors. 
Notes:  Per capita income is based upon 2000 PPP; wages for Georgia are for 2004 and for Uzbekistan  
are for 2003; employment growth for Turkmenistan is for 2000/2003; growth rates use compound rate. 
 
Based upon the empirical analysis of Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) the per 
capita income of the recipient countries (for remittances) is strongly and negatively 
  14related to remittance inflows. For this variable (as with many of the others) the size of 
the estimated coefficient depends significantly on the structure of the estimated 
equation; i.e., what set of variables is included in the regression including whether the 
regression includes region, country or country-pair fixed effects.
15 Generally, 
however, their empirical results find that a doubling of the per capita GDP of the 
recipient country is likely to reduce remittances by a fourth. Thus for example, 
controlling for other factors (such as GDP, distance, etc.) Uzbekistan would have 16 
times the remittances from Russia as Kazakhstan due to the fact that the former’s per 
capita income is only one fourth that of the latter. Workers, of course, migrate 
because of wages and as can be seen in table 6 the per capita income (used in the 
regressions) is a close proxy for wages. 
 
 Besides wage differences, in economies with significant unemployment or 
underemployment, the availability of jobs is another major consideration leading to 
emigration. Unemployment statistics for these economies is not provided in the table 
because in most of these countries this statistic is based upon official registered 
unemployment which is quite low and is not comparable to widely used western 
concepts based upon labor force surveys. Because of limited eligibility for benefits, 
many of the unemployed are not officially registered. In addition, those without jobs 
can usually find some type of subsistence work in agriculture or the informal sector. 
As an alternative, data are provided showing that GDP levels (as well as per capita 
GDP) remain significantly below what they were in 1989 and employment growth has 
been relatively modest over the last five years (although population growth has been 
low as well).  
 
More recently, the demand for labor in Russia has increased significantly due 
to that economy’s recent rapid economic growth and the fact that the Russian 
population has declined (despite inward migration of over 7 million from the CIS-11 
between 1991 and 2004 (CBR, 2005)) by over 6 million between 1990 and 2006 
(148.3 million to 142.2 million) due to a low birth rate and a number of other factors 
primarily associated with heath issues such as excessive drinking, AIDS, and TB. The 
negative natural growth of the population in Russia has therefore been partly offset by 
net migratory inflows from other CIS countries, some of which such as Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have growing 
populations (see table 3).  In recent years economic migration has become the major 
factor explaining migratory inflows in the CIS. This has resulted in a reversal of the 
declining trend of net migration inflows to Russia as economic migrants have 
replaced the flow of ethnic Russians returning to their homeland. The need for 
migrant inflows may only increase in time for Russia, as currently there are 
projections that the population of Russia will decline by another 11.5 million (or 8 per 
cent) between 2005 and 2020 (UN PD, 2006). CIS workers, especially those from 
Ukraine, Moldova and to a lesser degree the Caucasus have increasingly been going 
to the EU new member states (NMS). As western Europe has liberalized immigration 
from the NMS, shortages have arisen at home for some labor categories; this has 
increased the opportunities for CIS workers to emigrate to the NMS in order to fill 
these vacancies.  
 
                                                 
15 All their regressions include time fixed effects and the usual gravity variables such as GDP, distance, 
etc. 
  15CIS remittances have increased rapidly over the last five years and especially 
over the last year. Russian outflows to the CIS increased by a factor of ten between 
2001 and 2006 ($836 million to $8,868 million). What is the underlying explanation 
for this?  There are four possible reasons why remittances have increased; these are: 
1) workers are sending much larger amounts back home, 2) more workers have 
migrated, 3) workers have increased their use of mechanisms for sending funds that 
are officially monitored, or 4) officially recorded remittances have increased because 
of improved documentation and statistical estimation procedures.
16 There are several 
reasons why workers might be sending increasing amounts back home. The most 
obvious and easy to document is the increase in wages that has occurred over this 
time period. Focusing on Russian outflows over the last five years (2001-2006),
17 
total remittance outflows increased at an annual rate of 60.4 per cent. Over this 
period, rouble wages increased at an annual wage of 27.1 per cent (table 7). Much of 
this wage increase was a real wage increase as consumer inflation averaged only 12.5 
per cent a year. Given that the rouble dollar exchange rate was relatively stable, the 
increase in Russian wages in nominal dollar terms averaged 27.9 per cent a year. Note 
that Russian GDP increased at an annual rate of 26.6 per cent in dollar terms so the 
wage increase is basically consistent with GDP growth.  Hypothesizing that if the 
stock of migrants that were sending remittances in 2001 and the percentage sent home 
had stayed fixed, then the amount of remittances sent would increase at the rate of 
wage growth (27.1 per cent); thus the volume of remittances would have been 
expected to increase from $838 million in 2001 to $2,859 million in 2006. However in 
2006, remittances had increased to $8,868 million or over three times the level 
expected based upon Russian wage growth. Thus almost 68 per cent of remittances in 
2006 cannot be explained by the stock of migrants in 2001 or by the wage increases 
that occurred between 2001 and 2006. 
 
 There are a number of other possible reasons why the amount being sent back 
per migrant might have changed, such as a changing wage differential between Russia 
and the home economy, or a change in economic conditions back home, or a changing 
country composition of migrants; however neither these nor any other reason seem 
plausible as an explanation as to why migrant behaviour in this respect would have 
changed so significantly. Thus we conclude that the rapid increase or an almost 
tripling of remittances in real terms must be largely due to the other explanations, that 
being increased immigration, increased use of officially monitored financial channels, 
or improved reporting of remittances.  
 
It is possible that this increase in remittances (over 2001-2006) is due to an 
increase in migrants, as remittances are likely to be closely related to the stock of 
migrants, although a number of considerations, such as the length of stay and the 
wage differential between the home and destination countries are likely to affect this 
relationship. In fact, the World Bank has attempted to estimate remittances directly 
from migration data. However, data on migration within the CIS are poor, both in 
terms of estimating yearly flows and in estimating the stocks from various countries. 
Data on the stock of migrants are muddled in the CIS by the large number of migrant 
                                                 
16 For example, Mexico’s central bank concluded that the almost doubling of recorded remittances 
from the United States between 2002 and 2004 was due largely to a change in the regulations 
governing reporting by money transfer companies (Martinez, 2005).  
17 Russian data prior to 2001 did not contain information on the worker remittance component and thus 
2001 is the earliest year which would be generally comparable with 2006. 
  16flows composed of people moving back to their ethnic roots after the breakup of the 
Soviet Union. Thus there is no obvious way to estimate the number of migrants that 
are likely to make remittances from this existing data. 
 
Table 7 
Estimation of How Wage Changes Affected Russian Remittance Outflows, 2001-2006 
 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Annual  % 
Change 
Russian Monthly Wages, Roubles  ........ 3,240 4,360  5,499  6,740  8,555  10,728 27.1 
    Annual Wage Increase .....................  45.7 34.6  26.1  22.6  26.9  25.4   
Russian Consumer Inflation .................  21.5 15.8  13.7  10.9  12.6  9.7 12.5 
Exchange Rate  ....................................  28.1 31.3  30.7  28.8  28.3  27.2   
Russian Wages, Dollars  per Month.....  115 139  179  234  302  394 27.9 
    Annual Wage Increase, $ .................  51.4 20.8  28.6  30.7  29.2  30.5   
GDP, Billions of $ ..................................  307 345  431  592  764  979 26.1 
Remittances to CIS-11, Millions $ ........  836 1,050  1,663  3,351  4,679  8,868  60.4 
Adjusted  2001 Remittances by Wages  836 1,010  1,298  1,696  2,192  2,859 27.9 
Unexplained Increase in Remittances .   40  365  1,655  2,487  6,009   
Per Cent Unexplained...........................   3.8  21.9  49.4  53.2  67.8   
     Source:  Russian Central Bank, Russian Federal Statistics Service, International Monetary Fund. 
 
World Bank estimates of these migrant stocks from each of the CIS to the 
other CIS countries are presented in table 8. These data suggest that that most CIS 
migrants have primarily moved to other CIS countries, and the stock of foreign 
migrants in a CIS country is composed mostly of migrants from other CIS countries. 
Also, Russia is the primary destination for CIS migrants and is the destination for 
more than half of emigration from each of the other CIS. Depending on how it is 
calculated (inflows or outflows), migration within the CIS accounts for between 13.5 
to 16.2 per cent of world migration. These data are significantly different from some 
other estimates and may be of limited value; for example CIS-11 emigration to Russia 




CIS Migrant Stocks 
(Thousands) 
Source    /    To:  ARM  AZE  BEL  GEO  KAZ  KYR  MOL  RUS  TAJ  TUR  UKR  UZB  CIS  TOT  %CIS 
Armenia ................   6.6  20.3  6.0    485.5  7.8  69.1  595  813  73.3 
Azerbaijan ............ 119.4  4.1  8.9  31.6    853.4  8.5  120.3  1,146  1,365  84.0 
Belarus .................     0.4  45.2  2.8  943.8    358.8  1,351  1,800  75.1 
Georgia ................ 55.0  2.0  2.1    634.4    94.1  788  1,025  76.9 
Kazakhstan .......... 1.1  0.8  0.5  8.0  2,607.1  20.2  324.8  213.2  3,176  3,710  85.6 
Kyrgyzstan ...........     0.2  4.4    467.5  10.6  39.1   522  615  84.8 
Rep. of Moldova ..   2.8  0.1  7.9    279.9    218.8  510  706  72.2 
Russia .................. 23.9  743.3  125.7  1,809.0  113.4  159.3  64.0  69.4  4,788.4  436.0  8,332  11,480  72.6 
Tajikistan ..............     0.2  10.4  8.0  386.3    42.9  245.8  694  797  87.1 
Turkmenistan........ 1.1    0.2  0.7    176.8    33.0  212  260  81.3 
Ukraine ................. 3.5  154.3  8.5  220.9  9.5  204.7  3,590.5  5.4  321.2   4,519  6,082  74.3 
Uzbekistan ........... 1.6  1.0  0.9  149.7  125.0  925.9  198.0  94.6    1,497  2,186  68.5 
CIS Total.............. 206  915  166  2,288  264  367  11,351  273  206  6,411  895  23,340  30,838  75.7 
World Total.......... 235  182  1,191  191  2,502  288  440  12,080  306  224  6,833  1,268  25,740  190,590  13.5 
CIS Per Cent........ 87.4  76.8  86.8  91.4  91.7  83.4  94.0  88.9  92.0  93.8  70.6  90.7  16.2   
Source:  University of Sussex and World Bank. 
 
  17This dataset however does not provide information on yearly flows and that is 
what is needed in order to determine to what degree migration can explain the surge 
in remittances since 2001. The Russian Federal State Statistics Service (FSSS), 
however, provides a dataset with yearly estimates of migration flows (both net and 
gross) from the CIS; these are presented in chart 4 and table 9. Also, in table 9 the 
yearly increase in migration that would be necessary to explain the increase in 
remittances (after adjusting for wage changes) is determined to be slightly over 25 per 
cent. Over the five years this cumulative increase in the stock of migrants would need 
to increase by over 210 per cent; thus the migrant population would have had to triple 
between 2001 and 2006 in order to fully account for the increase in (wage adjusted) 
remittances. According to Russian FSSS estimates the cumulative increase in 
migrants between 2001 and 2006 is between 750 thousand to a million depending on 
whether net or gross immigration is used. The net figure would be the preferred 
estimate if those leaving had been sending remittances back home, but if they were 
not previously sending remittances to the other CIS, because perhaps they had no 
close family there, the gross number would be appropriate.  
 
Chart 4 
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     Source: Russian Federal Statistics Service 
 
These estimates, however, are unable to explain the rapid increase in 
remittances that has occurred since 2001. Firstly, there is no correspondence between 
the annual increases in remittances and the increases in migration to Russia. For 
example, there was a 39.6 per cent increase in remittances in 2005 and an 89.5 per 
cent increase in 2006, but the migration increases were essentially the same in these 
two years. Secondly, the number of reported migrants is not sufficient to explain the 
magnitude of the increase in remittances. For example, the cumulative increase in 
migrants between 2001 and 2006 of 750 thousand to a million is not large enough to 
account for an unexplained increase in remittances of over $6 billion; this would 
require that each migrant sent $6,000 home. Given an average yearly wage of under 
  18$5,000, this is not plausible. Even as an upper estimate, these million addition 
migrants are likely to account for only an additional $1.5 to $2 billion; thus of the 
over $8 billion increase between 2001 and 2006, $2 billion is likely due to wage 
increases and perhaps $1.5 to $2 billion to recorded migration flows. Thus almost half 
of the increase remains unexplained and is likely due to either a rapid increase in 
undocumented migration that is not reflected in the population data or to a significant 
change in how remittances are sent or calculated. The fact that there is a widening gap 
between reported Russian outflows and CIS inflows (chart 2) is circumstantial 
evidence of a change in Russian reporting.  This issue is addressed again in the next 
section where country detail on remittances and population flows and financial 




Estimation of Migration Flows Needed to Explain Russian Remittance Outflows, 2001-2006 
 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Annual  % 
Change 
Remittances to CIS-11, Millions $ ........  836  1,050  1,663  3,351  4,679  8,868  60.4 
Adjusted  2001 Remittances by Wages  836  1,010  1,298  1,696  2,192  2,859  27.9 
Yearly Needed Increase in Migration Stock    4.0  23.2  54.2  8.1  45.3  25.4 
Cumulative Increase in Migrant Stock      4.0  28.1  97.5  113.5  210.2   
Reported Net Migrant ............................  122,080  122,969  73,580  73,357  132,489  142,395   
   Cumulative Net Inflows ......................  193,271  315,796  414,070  487,539  590,462  727,904   
Reported Gross Inflows ........................  183,650  175,068  119,661  110,374  168,598  177,657   
   Cumulative Gross Inflows ..................  265,212  444,571  591,936  706,953  846,439  1,019,567   
Source:  Russian Central Bank, Russian Federal Statistics Service, International Monetary Fund. 
 
 
As discussed, there is very limited bilateral data on remittances, but table 10 
provides some estimates for intra-CIS remittances by the World Bank (Ratha and 
Shaw, 2006) derived from a model based upon migrant stocks, destination country 




CIS Remittances Estimated by World Bank 
(Millions $) 
Source    /    To:  ARM  AZE  BEL  GEO  KAZ  KYR  MOL  RUS  TAJ  TUR  UKR  UZB  CIS  TOT  %CIS 
Armenia ................ 47.06  13.66  0.05    6.1       66.87  93.89  71.2 
Azerbaijan ............               0    
Belarus ................. 5.95  1.86  0.56  0.03  2.93  189.31    11.95  212.59  543.55  39.1 
Georgia ................ 15.88  3.46  0.06  0.02  0.03  0.13  32.02  0.1  0.58  52.28  69.54  75.2 
Kazakhstan .......... 5.42  14.43  7.47  0.61  1.09  8.44  460.75  5.92  17.32  521.45  793.19  65.7 
Kyrgyzstan ...........     0.35    28.88  2.4  0.65   32.28  39.49  81.7 
Rep. of Moldova ..   0.46      40.58    13.94  54.98  137.61  40.0 
Russia .................. 483.97  431.88  168.04  200.85  122.27  137.51  340  268.49  308.76  2,461.77  2,829.00  87.0 
Tajikistan ..............      1.45  16.29       17.74  17.74  100.0 
Turkmenistan........ 6.1  3.2    0.88    17.68    0.37  28.23  28.23  100.0 
Ukraine ................. 54.75  47.76  58.29  23.57  14.06  7.64  199.38  1,219.6  18.8      1,643.85  1,643.85  100.0 
Uzbekistan ...........     9.23    1,11.04  76.63      196.9  196.9  100.0 
CIS Total.............. 572.07  549.65  234.32  239.25  146.89  147.72  550.88  2,122.25  372.34  0  353.57  0  5,288.94  6,392.99  82.7 
CIS-11 Total  88.1  117.77  66.28  38.4  24.62  10.21  210.88  2,122.25  103.85  0  44.81  0  2,827.17  3,563.99  79.3 
World Total.......... 940.01  699.99  330.01  346  176.03  189  919.99  3,117.02  466.03  0  594.95  0  7,779.03  
CIS Per Cent........ 60.9  78.5  71.0  69.1  83.4  78.2  59.9  68.1  79.9   59.4         
Source:  University of Sussex and World Bank. 
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Migrant remittances from Russia to the other CIS countries display a seasonal 
pattern, which is most marked for the compensation of employees and workers’ 
remittances (current transfers) components (chart 5). These items tend to peak in the 
summer and decline in the winter when there are fewer employment opportunities in 
sectors where the presence of migrants is particularly strong, such as construction, 
agriculture and retail informal trade. Current transfers, which are payments made by 
permanent residents in Russia to CIS residents, would be expected to display 
somewhat lower seasonality. However, their employment in sectors with a seasonal 
employment pattern imparts some seasonality to this series. 
 
Chart 5 
Migrant Remittances from Russia, Quarterly Balance of Payments Data 
2001 QI-2007 QI 






































































































IV. New Data on Remittances and Cross-Border Financial Flows from Russia, 




  Besides reporting data for remittances (including its three components) Russia 
has recently begun reporting data on two other types of financial flows that are 
different but closely related to remittances. These two data sets include one that 
estimates all cross-border payments between physical persons and a subset of this that 
  20records payments only through post offices and money transfer companies.
18 The 
primary reason for examining these two additional databases is that: 1) they provide 
some underlying detail about the nature of remittances, and 2) they provide detailed 
bilateral country specific values which can therefore be used to potentially estimate 
bilateral remittance data (see section V) which is not officially reported and may not 
even be unofficially calculated. Obtaining this bilateral data is of significance in that it 
potentially allows a calculation of remittances to those CIS-11 economies which 
either do not provide remittance data or provide questionable estimates. 
 
  The total amount of Russian cross-border outflow payments between physical 
persons (table 11) was $18.8 billion in 2006 ($21.4 billion in 2006QII-2007QI) while 
the amount that was conducted through money transfer systems and post offices (table 
12) was only $6.0 billion ($6.6 billion in 2006/7). These numbers compare to total 
official Russian remittance outflows of $11.4 billion in 2006 (table 5). Clearly this 
larger data set of financial flows contains some transfers related to activities not 
considered as part of remittances such as payments for goods and services by 
individual traders or consumers. For example, in 2006 $1.5 billion was transferred 
abroad by Russian residents to pay for goods and services (data on purchases of goods 
and services by non-residents in Russia is not reported by the CBR). These three types 
of financial flows are described in more detail in appendix I and the web links to their 
locations on the Central Bank of Russia’s web site are provided. The diagram in 
appendix II shows in what ways these three financial flows differ from one another 





Total Cross-Border Payments from Russia between Physical Persons, 2006QII-2007QI 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
  2006QII  2006QIII  2006QIV  2007QI  2006/7  % of CIS 
Armenia ............................................. 154  218  257  154  783 11.4 
Azerbaijan .......................................... 126  172  199  149  646 9.4 
Belarus ............................................... 14  17  20  17  68 1.0 
Georgia .............................................. 98  129  132  108  467 6.8 
Kazakhstan ........................................ 36  42  47  36  161 2.4 
Kyrgyzstan ......................................... 114  157  156  119  546 8.0 
Republic of Moldova ......................... 119  174  185  125  603 8.8 
Tajikistan ............................................ 204  347  341  206  1,098 16.0 
Turkmenistan..................................... 4  5  6  5  20 0.3 
Ukraine .............................................. 279  352  419  324  1,374 20.1 
Uzbekistan ......................................... 220  368  310  183  1,081 15.8 
CIS –11 Total..................................... 1,368  1,981  2,072  1,426  6,847 100 
World  Total....................................... 4,278  5,204  5,986  5,946  21,414 312.8 
     Source:  Russian Central Bank. 
 
                                                 
18 This information, when available, is sometimes used by central banks in making their calculations of 
remittances. This appears to be the case for the three economies discussed here as well as for Armenia 
(Roberts and Banaian, 2004), but exactly how it is used is generally not transparent, except in the case 
of Kazakhstan discussed in section IV.C. 
  21 
Table 12 
 
Total Cross-Border Payments from Russia through Postal Offices or Money Transfer Companies, 
 2006QI-2007QI 
19
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
  2006QI  2006QII  2006QIII  2006QIV  2006  2007QI  2006/7  % of CIS 
Armenia .............................................. 73  129  183  219  604  133  664  11.3 
Azerbaijan .......................................... 62  94  133  151  440  115  493  8.4 
Belarus ............................................... 6  10  13  14  43  14  51  0.9 
Georgia .............................................. 44  81  106  113  344  102  402  6.8 
Kazakhstan ........................................ 12  22  26  26  86  23  97  1.7 
Kyrgyzstan ......................................... 53  102  141  142  438  99  484  8.2 
Republic of Moldova .......................... 67  115  167  176  525  114  572  9.7 
Tajikistan ............................................ 123  187  323  324  957  198  1,032  17.6 
Turkmenistan...................................... 3  4  5  6  18  5  20  0.3 
Ukraine ............................................... 127  210  273  317  927  220  1,020  17.4 
Uzbekistan ......................................... 135  210  355  300  1,000  178  1,043  17.7 
CIS –11 Total..................................... 709  1,162  1,723  1,788  5,382  1,201  5,878  100.0 
World Total........................................ 815  1,290  1,911  1,988  6,005  1,372  6,561  111.6 
Source:  Russian Central Bank. 
 
Both of these two datasets of financial flows separate transactions between the 
CIS-11 and non-CIS economies. The two data sets differ significantly for flows to the 
non-CIS economies. In 2006, of the $18.8 billion in cross-border outflows, $12.5 
billion went to non-CIS countries, and of this, only $622 million was transferred by 
money transfer systems or post offices. Thus the vast majority of outflows to the non-
CIS were conducted through the banking system. The average size of transactions in 
the two datasets varied considerably with the average cross-border transaction being 
$8,153 but the average transaction using a money transfer service being only $1,334. 
The datasets were much more similar for transactions going to CIS-11 countries. In 
2006 total cross-border flows to the CIS countries equalled $6.3 billion with $5.4 
billion transferred by money transfer systems or post offices. The average size of the 
transactions was similar in the two cases (obviously since there is so much overlap) at 
slightly over $500. Thus cross-border outflows to the CIS-11 primarily use money 
transfer services and are composed of relatively small transactions.  Alternatively, the 
most significant difference between these two data sets is that CIS flows are only a 
third of the larger dataset while they account for almost 90 per cent of the smaller 
dataset.  
 
  The dollar amount of cross-border outflows using money transfer systems and 
post offices has increased dramatically over the last several years. As recently as 
2003, outflows amounted to only $1.3 billion; thus they have increased by over 66 per 
cent a year over the three years. If growth continues for the rest of 2007 at this rate or 
at the quarterly rate of 2006, these outflows will be over $10 billion in 2007 with over 
$9 billion going to the CIS. Note that over this same period of 2003-2006, total 
Russian remittances increased at an annual rate of over 52 per cent, while Russian 
remittances to the other CIS increased at an annual rate of almost 75 per cent per year. 
The close relationship between the growth in remittances and money transfers is 
shown in chart 6. The CIS-11 accounted for a larger percentage of money transfers 
                                                 
19 Data for 2007QII arrived too late to be included in this analysis, but total transfers were $2.05 billion 
which represents a 55.4 per cent increase over 2006QII; transfers to the CIS were $1.82 billion, an 
increase of 57.0 per cent.   
  22(89.6 per cent in 2006) than total remittance outflows (77.5 per cent) given in table 5, 
but this percentage was rather close to that of the workers’ remittances component 
(89.4 per cent). Note that since Russian remittance outflows to the CIS-11 increased 
even faster than money wire transfers over 2003-2006, it is unlikely that the rapid 
“unexplained” portion of remittance growth can be accounted for by migrants altering 





































         Source:  Russian Central Bank.; 2007 estimated by the authors. 
 
 
These financial transfer data are especially valuable in that they provide, 
unlike available remittance data, information on bilateral flows. As mentioned, a 
number of researchers such as Ratha and Shaw (2006) have proposed estimations of 
bilateral remittance flows based upon knowledge of migration flows. It is therefore of 
interest to determine to what degree this bilateral financial information either supports 
or refutes this migration methodology. There is a reasonably close relationship 
between these money transfers to a given CIS-11 economy and the size of the migrant 
population from that country in Russia. However, instead of using the migrant stocks 
presented in table 8 which seem to be overly weighted by permanent resettlements 
after the breakup of the Soviet Union, an alternative measure is estimated using 
population data by nationality from the 2002 Russian census that has been adjusted by 
net migration flows up to 2006. In chart 7 this migrant stock is plotted against money 
transfers for the period 2006QII-2007QI.  Kazakhstan appears as an outlier, with a 
level of remittances well below what would be expected given the estimated number 
of migrants from this country living in Russia. With the exclusion of this central 
Asian country (it has also been dropped from the chart), the correlation between both 
series is 70 per cent. Temporary, seasonal migration, which is an important source of 
remittances, is not adequately covered in these population figures, thus weakening the 
relationship between the two variables considered here. 
 
  23Chart 7 
Money Transfer Migrant Remittances from Russia 2006 QII-2007QI and Russian Population by 
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Source:  Rosstat, Central Bank of Russia 
 
There is also a suggestive relationship between the increase in net migrants 
from a CIS-11 country and the change in wire transfers to that country. In chart 8 the 
increase in wire transfers from Russia between 2006QI and 2007QI is plotted against 
the change in net migration to Russia in 2006. As with the overall level of money 
transfers and migrants in chart 7, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are outliers; given the 
flow of migrants, the magnitude of the money transfers to these countries are low 
relative to the other CIS-11 economies. Of the two, Uzbekistan is perhaps more of an 
anomaly in that money transfers seem quite low given the number of migrants in 
Russia and there are few obvious explanations for this. However, Uzbekistan is one of 
the largest recipients of money transfers as would be expected based upon the 
migration data. There are several reasonable explanations as to why remittances to 
Kazakhstan may be lower than what the migrant flows would suggest based upon the 
other CIS-11 economies.  As discussed, the percentage of migrants from Kazakhstan 
that is ethnic Russians returning home instead of economic migrants is probably much 
greater than for the other CIS-11. Kazakhstan also shares a long border with Russia 
and it is relatively easier for them to return home with cash or send it with others. In 
the gravity model estimates of Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006), remittances to a 
country that shares a border are one-half of what they would be otherwise. Clearly 
this is not due to the fact that real remittances are only half as much, but is due to the 
fact that official remittances are half as much due to the fact that a much higher 
percentage of the transfers are moving through undocumented channels. Of course 
this border effect would also reduce remittances to a number of the other CIS-11 
which also border Russia.  
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This border effect is probably important in explaining why both Russian cross-
border payments and money transfers to Belarus are so small, amounting to less than 
one per cent of Russian flows to the CIS-11 (tables 11 and 12). These values are 
especially low compared to Armenia and Georgia. Reported total remittance inflows 
to Belarus as reported by that country are similar to those of Armenia and Georgia in 
2005 (table 3); the stock of emigrants to Russia from Belarus is considerably larger 
than those from Armenia and Georgia (table 8). Thus the fact that these cross-border 
payments are only 11 to 16 per cent of those to these two other countries seems 
inconsistent even after accepting that a higher percentage of funds is probably 
physically carried across the border.   
 
An additional factor explaining why remittances to Kazakhstan are so small 
given its migration levels is its relatively high per capita income. Using the gravity 
model estimations discussed at the beginning of section III, the higher per capita 
income of Kazakhstan would reduce remittances to only a sixteenth or less of what 
they would be to the other central Asian CIS (not including Turkmenistan) after 
controlling for other factors. The gravity framework as proposed by Lueth and Ruiz-
Arranz (2006) however does not include the number of migrants as their other 
variables are supposed to capture this factor. For example the economic sizes and per 
capita incomes provide an alternative way of capturing this variable. An alternative 
approach is to incorporate the migrant stocks directly into the estimation and then ask 
what other factors affect the remittances per migrant. Ratha and Shaw (2006) have 
suggested the following formulation for estimating the influence of per capita income 
differences on remittances per migrant: 
 
  25R=Yh + (Yf –Yh)
β
 
where remittances per worker (R) are expected to be a function of the per capita 
income of the home (Yh) plus some difference between the income of the host 
(foreign) and home countries. They estimate β to be about .75. This formulation 
appears reasonable if asking how increases in the foreign (host) country’s income 
affects remittances from a given home country. The result being that a worker will 
send home at least what he could have made at home plus and additional amount that 
increases as the host country gets richer. However, if the question is addressed instead 
from the host country perspective, of how the income level of the home country 
affects remittances from a given host country, the formulation suggests that workers 
from richer countries will send back more income than workers from poorer 
countries.  This is counter to a frequently suggested relationship that the larger the 
income gap, the larger is the likely amount of remittances to be sent back home. This 
would also appear to be inconsistent with the spirit of the gravity model estimates, 
although this assessment would not necessarily be true from a purely technical point 
of view since the gravity formulation does not strictly address remittances per 
migrant. For example, even though lower per capita incomes (for the destination of 
remittances) increases remittances in that framework, it could increase remittances by 
increasing the number of migrants even if the transfer per migrant fell.   
 
Unfortunately this approach of using migrants to estimate remittances may be 
of limited usefulness for the CIS because the number of migrants is subject to much 
uncertainty since many migrants are either ethnic Russians moving back home with 
no propensity to transfer funds or else they are illegal and poorly documented. The 
estimate of this formula also seems inconsistent with what little survey knowledge is 
available for the region.  According to a 2005 survey, the average Tajik worker sends 
48 per cent of his income home as remittances (World Bank, 2006). Using the 
estimated figure that workers earn eight or nine times as much in Russia (table 6), 
after assuming half of this is used to cover living costs in Russia, the worker would 
send back income ($4,792) four times what he could earn back home ($1,134). 
However by plugging these numbers into the above equation, remittances per worker 
would equal: 
 
  R=$1,134 +($9,584 - $1,134)
.75 = $2,015 
 
Thus according to this equation, the typical Tajik worker would send home twice his 
potential domestic wage, not four times as suggested by the survey data. Regardless 
of which estimate is correct, the rationale for migrating is obvious since the income 
available for the family (back home) is still several multiples of what it would have 
been if the worker was employed domestically.  
 
The two data sets of money transfers provided by the Central Bank of Russia 
also includes information on the average size of money transfers by destination. 
Assuming that there are no significant differences in the number of transfers per 
migrant per year across the different national groups, this can be considered as an 
acceptable proxy for the average value of transfers per migrant. In chart 9 the average 
amount of a money transfer is plotted against the per capita income of the recipient 
country. There is a clear negative relationship between these two variables, with 
transfers to the poorer CIS-11 being much larger than those to the richer CIS-11. The 
  26rather small sums for Belarus and Kazakhstan, although consistent with the empirical 
relationship identified in chart 9, nevertheless do seem to be something of an anomaly 
in that given their per capita incomes, these are rather small transfers which are all the 
more surprising given the relative ease (due to short distances and large common 
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  Based upon existing empirical analysis of remittance flows, there is an 
expectation that inflows will come from countries richer than the home country while 
remittances will be sent to countries poorer than the home country. The actual volume 
of these flows will depend on a set of factors which the gravity model framework 
attempts to estimate. However, with limited data there may not be a sufficient number 
of observations to properly make these estimations, especially if the focus is on a 
given country with limited data. With this Russian data on money transfers, there is 
only one year of data (although there is quarterly data, there would be insufficient 
variation in many of the independent variables to fully use this data) and only 28 
countries. An alternative way to examine this relationship is to focus on the net 
transfers (inflows minus outflows) with the expectation that net flows should be 
positively correlated with the per capita income of the partner country. However, the 
actual size of the net flow will depend on a number of variables such as country size 
or distance that would need to be controlled for as well. In order to avoid these 
complications the net flow can be standardized by the size of the total flow (inflows 
plus outflows) and an index of net remittance intensity can be created. More precisely, 
a net remittance index (NRI) between countries i and j is proposed that is reminiscent 
of the intra-industry index used in trade analysis where: 
 
  27NRI ij = ((RIij - ROij)/(RIij + ROij)) x 100 
 
and RIij  represents remittance inflows from i to j and ROij represents remittance 
outflows from i to j.  This index can vary from –100 to +100; it would have a value of 
zero for countries where inflows equal outflows and a negative value when outflows 
exceed inflows. In chart 10 this remittance index (NRI) is plotted against the per 
capita income of the countries sending and receiving money transfers to Russia in 
2006QII-2007QI. There is a strong positive relationship between the NRI and the per 
capita income of the partner country; the t-statistic is over 9 (statistically significant at 
the 99.9 per cent level) and the R-squared is .72. Thus Russia primarily receives 
remittances (technically money transfers) from countries richer than itself and 
primarily sends remittances to those poorer than itself. The one observation that 
stands out in chart 10 is Switzerland (lower right of chart); the unexpectedly high 
level of outflows is unlikely to be due to Swiss workers sending remittance transfers 
back to Switzerland. This observation suggests that this dataset does contain some 
other types of capital flow. In addition there was data for only one quarter for 
Switzerland and it is probable that more observations would have resulted in a more 
normal or expected value for Switzerland.
20  If Switzerland is dropped the empirical 
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  The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) has provided for this study bilateral 
remittance data for three years (2004-2006) to and from the other CIS economies and 
the 15 largest other economies for each of the three components of remittances. The 
                                                 
20 Several of the countries did not have data for all four quarters, but there would appear to be no real 
reason not to include them since the remittance index would not, in theory at least, be affected by the 
overall size of the flows.  
  28data as received from the NBU are provided in appendix tables III-A (inflows) and 
III-B (outflows). These data are therefore significantly different from the Russian data 
just described in that they consist of actual remittance data instead of financial flows 
closely associated with remittances. These data have not been previously published 
although Ukraine, like Russia, does routinely provide a separate balance of payments 
for their transactions with the CIS (in addition to the world totals). Ukraine is 
primarily a destination for remittances with inflows being 25 times as large as 
outflows in 2006. Although it has fluctuated over the years, the other CIS receive 
slightly over one-half of Ukrainian outflows; however the vast majority of this (88 per 
cent in 2006) flows to Russia. By contrast, less than 10 per cent of Ukrainian 
remittance inflows come from the other CIS with the majority (90 per cent in 2006) of 
this coming from Russia.   
 
  The country and regional distribution of remittances varies significantly for 
each of the three components. For inflows into Ukraine, the CIS account for less than 
2 per cent of compensation of employees while they account for almost 23 per cent of 
workers’ remittances and over 70 per cent of migrant capital transfers. Since these 
latter two categories represent transfers from migrants which have worked abroad for 
longer periods, this would suggest that Ukrainians that go to Russia stay for longer 
periods than those that go to the non-CIS countries.  Alternatively, it may also suggest 
that compensation of employees remittances are unrecorded to a larger extent; given 
proximity and ease and frequency of travel for temporary workers, this seems likely. 
 
Table 13 
Ukrainian Remittances by Component to the World and CIS,  2004-2006 
 
Inflows $ Millions  Outflows $ Millions 
  2004  2005  2006  2004  2005  2006 
Compensation  216.8  358.9  540.1  5.3  10.1  9.7 
       CIS  5.0  7.8  9.1  2.5  3.8  3.6 
       Russia  4.5  6.4  8.1  0.9  1.9  2.3 
Workers’ Remittances  192.5  236.7  289.5  0.3  2.4  2.5 
       CIS  36.5  37.9  65.9  0.1  0.3  0.4 
       Russia  35.6  35.8  59.1  0.1  0.3  0.4 
Migrant Transfers  0.1  0.2  0.1  14.2  22.1  20.1 
       CIS  0.1  0.2  0.1  7.6  10.0  13.7 
       Russia  0.1  0.2  0.1  7.3  9.4  12.9 
Total  409.4  595.8  829.8  19.8  34.6  32.3 
      CIS  41.6  45.8  75.1  10.2  14.1  17.7 
      % CIS  10.2  7.7  9.0  51.7  40.6  54.9 
     Russia  40.2  42.4  67.2  8.3  11.6  15.6 
     % Russia  9.8  7.1  8.1  41.8  33.5  48.4 
    Source: National Bank of Ukraine 
 
Ukrainian data on remittances from Russia are difficult to reconcile with 
similar figures from Russia which theoretically should be similar. As noted earlier, 
Russia does not provide bilateral remittances data but has published information on 
bilateral payments by individuals through different channels. Payments through postal 
offices and money transfer companies are more likely to be closely associated with 
remittances than payments through the banking system, where payments for imports 
or investment abroad could contaminate the overall figures.  In 2006, Ukrainian 
remittances from Russia as reported by the Ukrainian authorities were only 7.3% of 
the money sent to Ukraine from Russia by individuals through postal offices and 
money transfer offices as reported by the Russian authorities. This discrepancy, as 
discussed below, is also found in relation to other countries for which bilateral data 
  29are available. It is worth noting that, according to Russian data, payments through 
postal offices and money transfers to CIS countries represent only 60% of total 
remittances to these countries, as reflected in their balance of payments, and thus if 
anything the Russian figure should be lower instead of higher than the Ukrainian 
figure. 
 
It is also interesting to compare the Ukrainian bilateral data with the estimates 
of the World Bank presented in table 10 since both supposedly provide data on 
Ukrainian remittance outflows to the other CIS members for 2006. The World Bank 
estimates do not have values for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan because their 
procedure calculates distributions using total reported remittances and applies these to 
total reported remittance inflows rather than calculating remittances directly, and 
since these two economies do not provide data on total remittances their procedure is 
unable to provide any estimates for these two countries.  These two economies are 
therefore dropped and Ukrainian remittances from the remaining CIS economies are 
plotted in chart 11; the line represents the 45 degree line. Although there is a clear 
positive relationship between the World Bank estimates and those reported by the 
NBU, the actual levels are considerably different. The World Bank estimates 
Ukrainian outflows to the nine CIS economies to be $1.643 billion while the NBU 
estimates them to be $17.24 billion, or over 10 times greater. In addition, the World 
Bank procedure tends to underestimate the larger bilateral flows and overestimate the 
smaller ones; the NBU data therefore has more variation in it. These comparisons 
reinforce what has already been shown in this paper and will be found later on as 
well, that being that remittance data are extremely poor and there are large 
inconsistencies of several magnitudes between what various countries are reporting 
and also between what is being estimated by various researchers. 
 
Chart 11 
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  30C. Kazakhstan 
 
  The National Bank of Kazakhstan has provided previously unpublished data 
for this study on personal money orders by country of origin for 2003 and 2004. 
These data provide quarterly figures for these two years to all 11 of the other CIS and 
8 other large economies, presumably the most important ones. Unlike the Russian 
data on money transfers, which do not match precisely any of the three remittance 
components, the world total of the Kazakhstan data matches precisely its entry in its 
official BOP statistics for workers’ remittances (IMF codes 2391 and 3391). This is 
the largest of the three components for outflows accounting for almost 60 per cent in 
2004, and the second largest component, accounting for 32 per cent of inflows (see 
table 19).  The values of this component for inflows and outflows covering 2003 and 
2004 are provided in table 14.  
 
Table 14 
Kazakhstan Personal Money Orders (Workers’ Remittances) by Country of Origin,  2003-2004 
 
Inflows  Outflows 
Millions $  Per Cent of Total  Millions $  Per Cent of Total 
  2003  2004  2003  2004  2003  2004  2003  2004 
Armenia ................................................. 0.02 0.06  0.06  0.11  0.65  0.94 0.16 0.12 
Azerbaijan ............................................. 0.04 0.13  0.10  0.24  0.71  1.82 0.17 0.23 
Belarus .................................................. 0.02 0.06  0.06  0.11  0.26  0.59 0.06 0.07 
Georgia .................................................. 0.04 0.18  0.10  0.34  0.35  1.11 0.08 0.14 
Kyrgyzstan ............................................ 0.12 0.47  0.32  0.89  0.30  0.77 0.07 0.10 
Republic of Moldova ............................. 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.10 0.01 0.01 
Russian Federation............................... 5.43 15.40  14.17  28.78  38.48  132.20 9.14  16.41 
Tajikistan ............................................... 0.50 0.52  1.31  0.97  0.17  0.31 0.04 0.04 
Turkmenistan......................................... 0.03 0.06  0.08  0.11  0.11  0.07 0.03 0.01 
Ukraine .................................................. 0.09 0.05  0.24  0.09  1.63  3.27 0.39 0.41 
Uzbekistan ............................................ 0.07 0.17  0.17  0.32  0.49  0.79 0.12 0.10 
CIS Total................................................ 6.36 17.10  16.61  31.96  43.20  141.97 10.26 17.62 
Other Countries................................... 31.95 36.40  83.39  68.04  377.85  663.81 89.74 82.38 
World  Total.......................................... 38.32 53.50  100.0  100.0  421.06  805.78 100.0 100.0 
Source:  Unpublished data provided by the National Bank of Kazakhstan 
  
What is perhaps most surprising about these remittance flows is the fairly 
small percentage of them that go or come from the other CIS. And within the CIS, 
Russian flows clearly dominate; in 2004 other than Russia, not one of the other CIS 
was the source or destination for even one per cent of total Kazakhstan flows. Given 
the anecdotal evidence of significant migration flows from the other central Asian CIS 
to Kazakhstan, these numbers seem surprising especially for the outflows. The four 
other central Asian CIS received only one-fourth of one per cent of Kazakhstan’s 
outflows in 2006; in total this amounts to less than $2 million. This is an incredibly 
low amount and suggests that unrecorded outflows to its low-income neighbouring 
countries may be substantial.  Physical proximity between Kazakhstan and the other 
central Asian countries may result in a comparatively lower use of official channels 
for transferring money in comparison with Russia.  
 
Since both this Kazak data and the Russian data introduced in section IV.A 
deal with money transfers, there would be some expectation that Russian outflows to 
Kazakhstan would be relatively close to reported Kazak inflows from Russia. 
Unfortunately the data from these two datasets are from different years and so no 
direct comparison is possible. However, Kazak worker remittances increased by 36 
  31per cent from 2004 to 2006 (see table 19); thus if the Russian proportion remained 
fixed, inflows from Russia would be approximately $21 million (15.4 x 1.36) in 2006. 
Yet Russian money transfers to Kazakhstan (table 12) are reported by the CBR as $86 
million. Thus there is a significant discrepancy between these two datasets by a 
multiple of four; this seems too large to be accounted for by slight differences is what 
is being conceptually measured.    
  
  The Kazak data have bilateral information on the workers’ remittances 
component to the other CIS and the Ukrainian data have bilateral information for all 
three components to the other CIS. Thus these two datasets have two flows in 
common, workers’ remittances in 2004 between these two countries; in theory these 
values should be the same in both datasets but they are not. Ukraine reports workers’ 
remittances outflows to Kazakhstan of only one thousand dollars while Kazakhstan 
reports this amount as five thousand dollars. Ukraine reports remittance inflows of 
$472 thousand from Kazakhstan while Kazakhstan reports a value of $3.27 million 
for the identical flow.  In both cases they differ by a factor of at least 10. Even if we 
allow that that some of these inflows to Ukraine from Kazakhstan might have been 
classified by Ukraine into one of the other two components, that reported total is only 
$591 thousand which is less than a fifth of Kazakhstan’s reported value for the one 
component. Thus this is just additional evidence that the remittance data reported by 
the each of the CIS are basically inconsistent with what the others are reporting.   
 
  The majority of these (personal money orders) flows to and from Kazakhstan 
are with countries outside the CIS. The United States is by far the largest source of 
these money orders accounting for between a quarter and a half (depending on the 
year); Germany is second and the source of slightly over 10 per cent. China is the 
largest destination for outflows accounting for between a quarter and a half 
(depending on the year); other significant destinations include Turkey, Germany and 
the United States. It is also worth noting that the country distribution differs quite 
noticeably between the two years; this is unlike the Russian money transfer data 
whose country distribution seems more stable.   
 
  An anomaly of this data is that in absolute dollar terms the inflows from 
Russia are so small relative to the outflows. In 2003-4 (using the two-year sum in 
table 14), outflows to Russia amounted to $170.7 million while inflows were only 
$20.8 million. This same pattern exists (to a lesser degree) in the Russian data on 
money transfers for 2006/7 where transfers from Kazakhstan to Russia amounted to 
$163 million while transfers from Russia were only $97 million. Although there may 
be an incentive for Kazaks to go to Russia since it has a per capita income 38 per cent 
above that of Kazakhstan, there would be far less of a reason for Russians to go to 
Kazakhstan. Nevertheless this pattern also exists for the rich advanced economies for 
which there are data. Over 2003-4 Kazakhstan received inflows of $57.3 million but 
sent out $421.9 million; thus the anomaly is not just money transfers to Russia, but 
the fact that Kazakhstan appears to transfer more to richer countries than it gets from 
them. The importation of foreign expertise from advanced economies (including 
Russia) to develop their energy resources is a possible explanation for these figures. 
However, Kazakhstan received inflows of only $5.1 million but sent out $448.4 
million to countries poorer than itself; this is consistent with the belief that migrants 
generally go to richer countries. Analyzed from a different perspective, 95.2 per cent 
of money order inflows came from richer countries and 4.8 per cent from poorer 
  32countries (over 2003-4); but for outflows 56.9 per cent went to richer countries while 
43.1 per cent went to poorer countries. Thus in percentage terms, inflows are more 




  Like Kazakhstan, Moldova does not release remittance data on a bilateral 
basis, but provided for this study previously unpublished data on money transfers 
from abroad by natural persons via commercial banks of Moldova. This data covering 
2003-2006 is presented in table 15. This data like the Russian money transfers data 
(and unlike that of Kazakhstan) does not correspond precisely to any of the three 
components of officially reported remittances; thus if it is being used at all in the 
estimation of remittances by the NBM it is being significantly adjusted in some 
manner. Based upon funds transferred through commercial banks, this data differs 
from the Kazak data but would be somewhat similar to the difference between the two 
Russian datasets.  
 
Table 15 
Money Transfers from Abroad to Moldova by Natural Persons via Commercial Banks 
 of Moldova, 2003-2006 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
  2003  2004  2005  2006 
% of Total 
  in 2006 
Russia  ......................................... 66.31  124.30  276.92  367.30  43.0 
Other CIS .................................... 1.20  1.47  3.8  7.62  0.9 
Non- CIS ...................................... 249.78  296.64  402.52  479.63  56.1 
     Italy ......................................... 67.69  81.45  137.04  163.11  19.1 
    Portugal ................................... 25.74  31.56  31.45  25.24  3.0 
    Spain ....................................... 7.93  14.39  22.95  27.53  3.2 
    Ireland ...................................... 3.87  9.26  14.97  22.23  2.6 
    Great Britain ............................ 6.96  10.82  18.12  20.08  2.3 
    Greece...................................... 4.74  12.38  15.63  15.34  1.8 
    Turkey ...................................... 3.03  6.50  11.89  14.68  1.7 
    Israel ........................................ 9.36  17.22  14.86  13.58  1.6 
    Germany.................................. 13.35  13.22  11.64  11.85  1.4 
    Romania................................... 2.05  3.82  4.67  9.80  1.1 
    France...................................... 4.15  6.49  21.07  8.87  1.0 
    Cyprus...................................... 2.59  5.32  6.90  7.50  0.9 
           
World  Total................................ 317.29  422.41  683.24  854.55   
     Source:  National Bank of Moldova. 
 
Total money transfers to Moldova in 2006 were $854.6 million while total 
remittance inflows were $1,182 million; thus it would appear that this dataset captures 
a significant percentage of Moldovan remittances. The majority (56.1 per cent) of 
remittances come from outside of the CIS and another 43.0 per cent come from 
Russia. However less than one per cent of money transfers to Moldova come from the 
other CIS. This is similar to what was found for Kazakhstan and Ukraine where 
remittances from the other CIS-11 to those economies appeared to be largely 
negligible. The implication of this is that remittances from Ukraine to Moldova are 
extremely small; this is surprising given Ukraine’s size, geographical proximity, much 
higher per capita income, and shared history and language. In addition, as shown in 
table 8, Ukraine is listed as the second largest destination (after Russia) for Moldovan 
emigration with a stock of migrants almost as large as that of Russia. Thus there 
would appear to be some fundamental mismatch between the migration flow data and 
this money transfer data. Note that the World Bank estimates Ukrainian remittances to 
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money flows from Ukraine are only 2 per cent of those from Russia. As such it would 
appear that the Moldovan money transfer data can probably not be used to estimate 
Moldovan remittances amongst the CIS.  The division of remittances between the CIS 
and non-CIS suggested by this data may be more realistic. Although emigration is 
estimated to be much higher to the CIS (Russia and Ukraine), the wage levels are 
higher in the non-CIS and thus a smaller stock of migrants could be sending back 
significantly larger amounts per worker.  
 
The money transfers from Italy seem large given the size of its migrant stock. 
The World Bank Migration Matrix (WB-MM, 2007) estimates the number of 
Moldovan migrants in Italy as 6,927 while those in Romania total 39,292, the U.S. 
22,811, Israel 19, 243, and Portugal 3,564. Thus even considering wage differentials, 
the Italian value seems distorted. The fact that the money transfers from Russia and 
Italy seem extremely large raises the question whether these countries dominate these 
flows due to some financial market consideration. For example, maybe the banks or 
money transfer services processing these money transfers have their headquarters in 
these two countries and for this reason are being credited as the ultimate source of the 
funds even in cases where they are coming from some other country. The degree to 
which these two countries have some special financial tie to Moldova could not be 
determined. However, as evidence of Italian ties to the Moldovan financial system it 
should be noted that Veneto Banca of Italy was the first foreign bank to enter 
Moldova with its acquisition of Eximbank, but that did not happen until May 2006 
(EBRD, 2006).  
 
V. New Estimates of Remittances in the CIS 
 
  In this section the data on cross-border financial flows (described above) is 
used to make estimates of remittance flows to the other CIS including those 
economies which do not provide this information or those whose data is questionable. 
Given that Russia provides data on total remittances to the CIS-11 (but not to the 
individual countries) the procedure is to determine how Russian remittances are 
distributed amongst the CIS-11 using the cross-border financial flows and then apply 
this distribution to total CIS-11 remittances in order to get individual CIS-11 country 
remittances. Obviously each of the CIS-11 receives remittances from other countries 
besides Russia, but it is reasonable to assume that Russia is the largest source, and if 
nothing else, the Russian estimate would provide the minimum value which is a 
significant improvement upon some of the existing missing values in the BOP data. 
 
  As discussed, total transfers to the CIS-11 in the dataset of wire and post 
transfers (summarized in table 12 and further described in appendix I.3) which 
totalled $5,878 million in the 2006QII/2007QI year was 86 per cent of the total for 
CIS-11 transfers of $6,847 million in the more inclusive cross-border financial 
payments dataset (summarized in table 11 and further described in appendix I.2) 
covering the same period. Thus essentially the vast majority of cross-border financial 
payments from Russia to the other CIS are conducted through money transfer 
companies and postal offices. More importantly, however, (considering the objective 
of this section) is the fact that the country distribution of these two datasets is 
extremely similar with a simple correlation coefficient of over 98 per cent; these 
distributions are provided in right-hand columns of tables 11 and 12). The distribution 
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case is it over three percentage points.   
 
  The more inclusive cross-border financial payments data are further sub-
divided into payments made by resident and non-resident individuals on a bilateral 
basis. These outflows to the CIS-11 countries are provided in tables 16 and 17. The 
overall amount of flows of the two types is fairly close with residents transferring 
$3.1 billion in 2006/7 while non-residents transferred $3.7 billion. The motive of 
these two groups might vary significantly in terms of their correspondence to true 
remittances and thus a different country distribution of these two classes of cross-
border financial payments would raise questions as to which distribution would be 
most appropriate for estimating true remittances. Luckily, the country distribution of 
these two types (i.e., resident and non-resident) of cross-border financial flows are 
highly correlated at over 99 per cent; thus the distinction between resident and non-
resident payments is not significant in obtaining a useful country distribution that can 
be used to estimate remittances.  
 
Table 16 
Total Cross-Border Payments from Russia by Resident Individuals, 2006QII-2007QI 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
  2006QII  2006QIII  2006QIV  2007QI  2006/7  % of CIS 
Armenia ............................................. 67  90  112  77  346 11.1 
Azerbaijan .......................................... 54  73  86  72  285 9.2 
Belarus ............................................... 7  8  11  9  35 1.1 
Georgia .............................................. 48  62  63  53  226 7.3 
Kazakhstan ........................................ 17  19  23  19  78 2.5 
Kyrgyzstan ......................................... 47  62  65  60  234 7.5 
Republic of Moldova ......................... 53  74  83  67  277 8.9 
Tajikistan ............................................ 89  145  149  103  486 15.6 
Turkmenistan..................................... 2  2  3  3  10 0.3 
Ukraine .............................................. 134  162  197  162  655 21.1 
Uzbekistan ......................................... 95  154  135  91  475 15.3 
CIS –11  Total.................................... 613  851  927  716  3,107 100 




Total Cross-Border Payments from Russia by Non-Resident Individuals, 2006QII-2007QI 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
  2006QII  2006QIII  2006QIV  2007QI  2006/7  % of CIS 
Armenia ............................................. 87  128  146  77  438 11.7 
Azerbaijan .......................................... 71  99  113  77  360 9.6 
Belarus ............................................... 7  9  9  8  33 0.9 
Georgia .............................................. 50  67  69  55  241 6.4 
Kazakhstan ........................................ 19  23  24  17  83 2.2 
Kyrgyzstan ......................................... 67  95  90  59  311 8.3 
Republic of Moldova ......................... 66  100  102  58  326 8.7 
Tajikistan ............................................ 116  203  192  103  614 16.4 
Turkmenistan..................................... 2  3  3  2  10 0.3 
Ukraine .............................................. 146  190  222  162  720 19.2 
Uzbekistan ......................................... 125  214  175  91  605 16.2 
CIS-11  Total...................................... 756  1,131  1,145  709  3,741 100 
     Source:  Russian Central Bank. 
 
  As a first estimate, the calculated country distribution for cross-border 
financial transfers (as calculated in table 12 and reproduced as data column one in 
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data row of table 18 as obtained from table 5) in order to obtain individual country 
estimates of Russian remittances. These estimates are presented in the non-shaded 
sections of table 18.  The 2006 distribution, since it is the only one that is available, is 
applied backward to the earlier years (2001-2005). An alternative procedure might be 
to use migrant flows to somehow adjust this distribution for earlier years, but our 
assessment is that the migration numbers are so unreliable that they would not 
improve the estimates.   
 
  
    Table 18 
 
Estimation of CIS Remittances from Cross-Border Payments from Russia through Postal Offices 
or Money Transfer Companies,  2000-2006 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
  Distribution  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001  2000 
Russian Remittances to the CIS-11  100.0  8,868.0  4,679.0  3,351.0  1,663.0  1,050.0  836.0  445.0 
Armenia .............................................. 11.30  1,001.8  528.6  378.5  187.9  118.6  94.4  50.3 
Azerbaijan .......................................... 8.39  743.8  392.4  281.1  139.5  88.1  70.1  37.3 
Belarus ............................................... 0.87  76.9  40.6  29.1  14.4  9.1  7.3  3.9 
Georgia .............................................. 6.84  606.5  320.0  229.2  113.7  71.8  57.2  30.4 
Kazakhstan ........................................ 1.65  146.3  77.2  55.3  27.4  17.3  13.8  7.3 
Kyrgyzstan ......................................... 8.23  730.2  385.3  275.9  136.9  86.5  68.8  36.6 
Republic of Moldova .......................... 9.73  863.0  455.3  326.1  161.8  102.2  81.4  43.3 
Tajikistan ............................................ 17.56  1,557.0  821.5  588.3  292.0  184.3  146.8  78.1 
Turkmenistan...................................... 0.34  30.2  15.9  11.4  5.7  3.6  2.8  1.5 
Ukraine ............................................... 17.35  1,538.8  811.9  581.5  288.6  182.2  145.1  77.2 
Uzbekistan ......................................... 17.74  1,573.5  830.2  594.6  295.1  186.3  148.3  79.0 
Source: Calculation by the authors. 
 
A fuller discussion of how these numbers correspond to the reported CIS 
remittance inflows in table 3 will follow after introducing several other factors. 
However, at his juncture it is worth pointing out that these estimated Russian 
remittances are greater than the total reported remittances for five of the CIS-11 
including Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine; in four of the cases 
(all but Georgia) the estimates are larger by over 50 per cent. In addition, of course, 
these economies are likely to get remittances from other countries as well, including 
non-CIS countries; adding these to the Russian estimates would further increase these 
estimated inflows above their reported values.  In addition, this procedure provides 
some estimates for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; two countries for which previously 
there were no reliable estimates. These estimates suggest that remittances are quite 
small for Turkmenistan as one might possibly expect from the “isolationist” policies 
that it has followed. This result is further supported by the fact that the estimated 
migrant stock (table 8) in Russia from Turkmenistan is the smallest of any of the CIS. 
Uzbekistan, on the other hand, is found to have the largest remittance inflow from 
Russia of any of the CIS (about equal to Tajikistan or Ukraine); its estimated stock of 
migrants in Russia is sizable but far from the largest. This result is, of course, due to 
the fact that Uzbekistan receives the largest amount of money transfers from Russia. 
One estimate that seems quite low is that of Belarus. Belarus has a sizable migrant 
population in Russia, but for some reason they do not appear (as discussed in section 
III) to be using either the banking or money transfer services to send funds home.    
 
The estimates presented in table 18 for Russian remittance outflows to the 
other CIS are compared in chart 12 to the World Bank estimates provided in table 10 
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estimates. The sum of the estimates calculated here are almost three times as large as 
those of the World Bank and there is no obvious discernable relationship between the 
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The estimates in table 18 for Russian outflows to Ukraine can be compared to 
the estimates of these flows obtained from the National Bank of Ukraine presented in 
section IV.B. As previously discussed reported Ukrainian remittance inflows are quite 
small (7.3 per cent in 2006) relative to reported money transfers from Russia and even 
smaller (4.4 per cent) relative to the estimates of Russian remittances to Ukraine 
provided in table 18. Also note that NBU reported Russian remittances to Ukraine are 
only 21.8 per cent of World Bank estimates (table 10) of this bilateral flow. The very 
low values of remittances as reported by the NBU relative to Russian reported values 
of money transfers is also evident in the inconsistency of estimates of remittance 
flows going in the opposite way, i.e., from Ukraine to Russia. According to the NBU 
remittances outflows to Russia in 2006 were $15.6 million while the Russian 
authorities report money wire transfers of $93 million for 2006QII to 2007QI and 
total individual financial transactions of $163 million over the same period.  
 
After Russia, the only other CIS economy with significant remittance outflows 
is Kazakhstan; while Russia accounted for 71 per cent of total CIS outflows in 2005, 
Kazakhstan accounted for 20 percent with the remainder of the CIS accounting for 
less than 10 per cent (table 4). Therefore in order to estimate CIS remittance inflows, 
it is necessary to account for how Kazakhstan’s outflows are distributed to the other 
CIS. A very rough estimate of this is possible using the Kazak money transfer data 
provided in the previous section. Unfortunately, the personal money orders remittance 
flows for which there is bilateral data are only one of the three components of total 
remittances. Thus the country distribution of the other two flows must somehow be 
estimated based upon the distribution of the remittance component. Kazakhstan’s total 
remittance data for 2003-2006 broken up into the three components is presented in 
table 19.  The top row of inflows and outflows (labelled as remittances) corresponds 
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information, accounts for only about a third of the total; for outflows, however this 
component accounts for well over one half of the total. The country distribution of the 
money order remittance flows is significantly different in 2003 and 2004. Although 
there is no available information about the country distribution of the other two flows, 
some insight about this can possibly be gained from examining the CIS/non-CIS 
distribution for these three components which is available for Russia and Ukraine.  
 
Table 19 
Kazakhstan’s Remittances by Component 2003-2006 
 
Millions $  Per Cent of Total 
  2003  2004  2005  2006  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Inflows                 
   Remittances  38.3  53.5  55.8  73.0  26.0  32.3  31.2  38.9 
   Compensation  3.9  3.9  6.3  10.6  2.6  2.3  3.5  5.7 
   Transfers  105.3  108.5  116.4  103.9  71.4  65.4  65.2  55.4 
 Total Inflows  147.5  165.8  178.4  187.5  100.0  100.0  1000.0  100.0 
             
Outflows                 
   Remittances  421.1  805.8  1,158.5  1,999.5  52.5  59.5  57.9  65.9 
   Compensation  229.8  413.7  734.7  961.9  28.7  30.6  36.7  31.7 
   Transfers  150.8  134.2  106.9  74.9  18.8  9.9  5.3  2.5 
 Total Outflows  801.7  1,353.7  2,000.0  3,036.3  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source:  IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook. 
 
The percentage of Russian remittance flows to the CIS relative to the world 
for the three remittance components varies by component and for each component the 
CIS percentage has varied significantly by year (see table 5). Thus any precise 
statements about the CIS distribution of Russian flows are difficult to make. Overall 
however, the CIS percentage is much greater (about twice) for compensation and 
remittances than capital transfers, and the former two have roughly a similar CIS 
percentage although recently it has been higher for remittances. If we apply the same 
CIS percentage from Kazakhstan’s workers’ remittance outflows (10.3 per cent for 
2003 and 17.6 per cent for 2004, table 14) to their compensation outflows, and apply a 
percentage of one-half of those above (5.2 per cent to 8.8 per cent) to capital transfer 
outflows, an estimate for overall Kazakhstan remittance outflows to the CIS is 
possible. This would yield the estimates provided in table 20. 
 
Table 20 
Estimates of Kazakhstan’s Remittance 
Outflows to the CIS 2003-2004 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
  2003  2004 
   Worker Remittances ..........................  43.20  141.97 
   Compensation ....................................   23.58   72.89 
   Capital Transfers ...............................  7.84   11.81 
Total CIS ...............................................   74.62   226.67 
Total World ..........................................  801.7  1,353.7 
CIS Per Cent of World.........................   9.31  16.7 
          
 
In the case of Ukraine, however, the CIS portion of workers’ remittances (16.8 
per cent) is significantly lower than the portion for compensation (37.1 per cent) or 
capital transfers (68.2 per cent) in 2006. This would then suggest that the CIS portion 
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remittances for which there is bilateral data. Given that the pattern of the CIS 
proportion across components varies significantly between Russia and Ukraine, 
suggest that it is probably not a reliable procedure to estimate the CIS percentage for 
Kazakhstan based upon other countries. This problem is mitigated to some degree due 
to the fact that workers’ remittances are by far the largest component of outflows and 
thus the significance of alternative assumptions about the CIS proportion of the other 
two components is likely to be limited importance. In addition most of Kazakhstan’s 
outflows are likely to go to Russia and thus the amounts going to the other CIS are 
quite insignificant.  This conclusion is of course at variance with anecdotal evidence 
about migrants from the other central Asian CIS although the estimated migrant stock 
(table 8) from these economies is not particularly significant (Uzbekistan may be an 
exception). As discussed, the possibility that money transfers from Kazakhstan to the 
other CIS are being recorded as going to Russia, because they are being conducted 
through a Russian money transfer service, needs to be addressed; but we have been 
unable to ascertain the degree to which this might be the case.      
 
Therefore we conclude that CIS-11 remittances to the other CIS-11 are quite 
insignificant and can be largely ignored. The issue remains of how to estimate non-
CIS flows especially in the cases where our estimated inflows from Russian are 
greater than the countries’ reported total inflows. Estimates of CIS emigration show 
that approximately one-quarter of emigrants from most of the CIS (including Russia) 
have gone to non-CIS countries (table 8). Given that most of these destination 
countries probably have per capita incomes as great or greater than Russia, the 
migrants’ ability to send home remittances would be at least as great.   
 
Despite the fact that the population data on migrants suggest that three-
quarters of Russian emigrants have gone to other CIS countries, Russia receives 
approximately three-quarters of its remittance inflows from outside the CIS (table 5). 
Given that the other CIS countries have a similar percentage of emigrants outside the 
CIS, it is reasonable to expect that they also receive a sizable proportion of their 
remittances from outside the CIS. The National Bank of Ukraine reported that 91 per 
cent of its total remittance inflows come from outside the CIS in 2006.  Also we have 
remittance inflow data (only the worker remittance component) for Kazakhstan, and 
they report that 68 per cent of inflows in 2004 (83 per cent in 2003) came from 
outside the CIS. Likewise, the Moldovan data suggest that a majority of inflows come 
from outside the CIS.  Although there is not sufficient data with which to make 
reliable estimates of non-CIS inflows for all of the CIS-11, what can be concluded is 
that the inflows from Russia do not represent a reasonably close estimate of total 
inflows to the CIS-11. While only speculative, the available evidence would tend to 
suggest that it is quite possible that inflows from Russia represent only a half of total 
inflows into the CIS-11 or even less. The Russian proportion might reasonably be 
expected to be greater for central Asia as compared to the Caucasus and eastern 
Europe, but there is no firm empirical basis for making this assessment.      
 
  Combining all this information, it would appear reasonable to speculate that 
the estimates of Russian remittances to the CIS-11 as provided in table 18 could be 
doubled (based on non-CIS inflows) in order to arrive at a figure for remittance 
inflows for each of the CIS-11. This produces some very large estimates relative to 
officially reported remittance inflows. For the CIS-11 overall estimated remittance 
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that we have values for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; but even without them our 
estimates are 2.5 times larger than official inflows. The magnitude of increase varies 
significantly amongst the CIS-11. The largest estimate relative to official figures is for 
Armenia where we have an estimate of $2 billion while official inflows for 2006 are 
only $505 million. Thus our estimates are four times bigger than the official 
estimates. On the other hand, we have no reason to question the official Belarus 
remittance data based upon our data, but we have observed that the data introduced in 
this study seem to have values for Belarus significantly smaller than what we might 
expect (see section IV.A). Our estimates for the other CIS-11 relative to official 
inflows are 83 per cent above for Azerbaijan, 150 per cent above for Georgia, 57 per 
cent above for Kazakhstan, 225 per cent above for Kyrgyzstan, 46 per cent above for 
Moldova, 206 per cent above for Tajikistan, and 270 per cent above for Ukraine.     
 
 
VI. Implications and Summary 
 
A major objective of this paper has been to examine the remittance data 
released by the governments of the CIS economies and determine their overall 
consistency and point out where the data appear to be incorrect as well as estimate 
likely values for missing values. Various other sources of data, thought to be highly 
correlated with remittances, have been introduced including money transfers and 
migration flows and we have obtained previously unpublished data on bilateral 
remittances and financial flows from several central banks. What then can we 
conclude about CIS remittances? Foremost, the data on remittances as released by the 
central banks of the CIS are fundamentally inconsistent; some of them must be 
incorrect because there is no logical way to reconcile them. This is not a matter of five 
or ten percent, but often a factor of several hundred per cent or even more. It is 
difficult to isolate where the errors lie as it comes down to a “he said” and “she said” 
type of situation, and it is impossible for us to assess whose data practices are the 
most accurate.  Unfortunately because of the large number of inconsistencies and 
missing or unknown data, it is not possible to determine with a high degree of 
confidence where the problems actually lie. Questions about the accuracy of 
remittance data are widespread and it is possible that a close examination of this issue 
for other regions of the world would turn up many of the same inconsistencies.  
 
Due to questions about remittance data, other researchers have suggested their 
estimation based upon the stock of migrants. We cannot assess the overall accuracy of 
that approach, however, it seems ill suited for the CIS region for various reasons. 
Most importantly, there has been substantial migration for non-economic reasons and 
much of the economic migration is undocumented. The money transfer data provided 
by Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Russia are promising in that they provide important 
bilateral information that is useful for the analysis of remittances more generally and 
as a method of reconciling inconsistencies, but there are limits to what can be deduced 
from them and they appear to have some anomalies of their own. The bilateral 
remittance data obtained from Ukraine has also proved useful in determining where 
some inconsistencies lie.  
 
Attempts to improve data on remittances need to be pursued along numerous 
dimensions, but the use of anonymous surveys might be especially promising given 
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conceal these flows by avoiding official channels such as banks or money transfer 
services. Increased micro analysis of individual behaviour would allow various other 
pieces of macro data to be better assessed and reconciled. 
 
With these qualifications in mind, the analysis here suggests that a number of 
the CIS are significantly undercounting remittance inflows. It is reasonable to suggest 
(but far from certain) that actual remittances for some of these economies could easily 
be two or even more times what is commonly reported. These estimates rely mostly 
on Russian data on financial transfers. Bilateral financial or remittance data from 
several other of the CIS suggest that remittances amongst the other CIS are rather 
limited. In addition, the analysis presented here suggests that the CIS-11 probably 
obtain more than half of their total remittances from outside the CIS. Our estimates 
that CIS-11 remittances from Russia are probably at least what Russia reports 
(approximately $9 billion in 2006) and then adding in non-CIS remittances which 
would be at least this amount would suggest CIS-11 remittances are at least $18 
billion but probably more. The IFAD study discussed in section III concluded that 
CIS-11 remittances were approximately $26.6 billion; this would amount to 
approximately 7.0 per cent of their GDP. Thus the IFAD estimates appear reasonably 
realistic even if they are four times what the CIS-11 report in their balance of 
payments statistics.  There are at least three other studies that have examined 
remittances using various methods but generally relying on survey data, that have also 
concluded the official balance of payments estimates are too low by a factor of two or 
more. These include Mellyn (2003) for the Philippines, Korovilas (1999) for Albania, 
and most relevant for this study, Roberts and Banaian (2004) for Armenia.  
 
We are less able to assess the likely level of remittance inflows into Russia; 
IFAD figures suggest that Russia has undercounted these also by a factor of four. For 
example, IFAD estimates Russian remittance inflows in 2006 at $13.8 billion while 
Russia reports a figure of $3.3 billion. What is clear, however is that the other CIS 
appear to be undercounting these flows even compared to what Russia is officially 
reporting in that those for which we have some data, show that their reported 
remittances to Russia are quite small relative to Russian data on financial transfers.  
  
In Table 21 a range of estimates of remittances to the CIS countries as a 
percentage of GDP are presented along with data on several other important financial 
flows; an average for the last three years is provided to give a more stable picture of 
these flows.
21 The top of the range is a very crude estimate using our estimates of 
remittances from Russia which is then adjusted upward by 100 per cent for the 
European, Caucasus and Kazak economies  to account for remittances from the rest of 
the world while the other central Asian are adjusted upward by 50 per cent. Even this 
procedure provides estimated remittances to the CIS-11 of only 4.7 per cent of GDP 
which is still significantly below the 7.0 per cent estimate of IFAD.  The 1.6 per cent 
remittance estimate for Russia is taken from the IFAD estimate.  
 
                                                 
21 Adjusting remittance flows from values other than those presented in balance of payment statistics 
raises some additional data issues. For example, since the credits and debits equal in the balance of 
payments, if remittances (which are credits) are assumed to be significantly larger, then an obvious 
question is what entries on the debit side need to be adjusted as well. For this and several other reasons 
(the included categories are not exhaustive) the rows in table 21 do not add to zero. 
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Table 21 
Financial Flows in the European Emerging Markets 
















CES Europe  ............ 5.0 2.7  0.5 0.7 1.7 -3.2 -2.4  -4.9
   NMS ....................... 5.9 2.7  -0.8 0.8 1.4 -4.0 -2.2  -3.2
   South-east Europe  6.2 0.3  3.7 2.8 9.8 -1.6 -5.0 -17.8
   Turkey .................... 2.9 3.3  2.4 0.1 0.2 -1.7 -2.2  -5.2
CIS ............................ 3.2 0.9  -2.9 -0.3 2.2  -- 0.9 -2.4 -7.9  10.4
   Russia .................... 2.5 0.5  -3.0 -0.7 1.6  -- 0.4 -2.2 -8.9  12.9
CIS-11 ....................... 5.5  2.0  -2.5 1.1 4.7 -- 2.4 -3.0 -4.9  2.3
Armenia .................... 5.6 0.0  0.2 5.5 34.3  --20.1 -3.7 -3.3 -14.6
Azerbaijan ................. 16.9  0.2  -9.1 1.9 7.3 -- 4.0 -9.8 -3.5  5.2
Belarus ...................... 0.9 0.0  2.1 0.2 1.1 -0.6 -1.0  -3.2
Georgia ..................... 10.1 0.5  1.6 5.5 14.5  --  5.9 -2.3 -3.6 -19.5
Kazakhstan ............... 6.9 3.2  0.4 0.5 0.5  -- 0.3 -7.0 -6.5  9.4
Kyrgyzstan ................ 5.4 0.0  0.4 11.3 30.5  -- 12.5 -3.2 -5.6  -21.6
Republic of Moldova  5.5 -0.2  1.3 5.5 42.0  -- 31.0 -3.6 -4.7  -39.4
Tajikistan ................... 2.5 0.1  -3.0 11.1 52.4  -- 22.9 -2.3 -1.2  -18.1
Turkmenistan ............ 2.8  0.0  NA 0.2 0.2 -- 0.1 NA -1.5  6.1
Ukraine ..................... 5.7  3.3  -6.7 0.5 3.2 -- 0.6 -1.4 -5.8  1.9
Uzbekistan ................ 1.0 0.0  NA 1.6 10.0  -- 6.7 NA -5.8  5.8
Source: Calculations by the author; aid and investment income values based on 2004-05; some data on 
capital flows and payments for capital services not available for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan but believed 
to be small and assumed as zero for regional aggregates. 
 
 
For the CIS-11 remittances are less than FDI inflows; this is similar to the 
general pattern for all emerging and developing economies as well as for the other 
transition economies in central, east and south-east Europe (CES Europe). 
Remittances, however, are larger than portfolio flows and other capital flows while 
they are several times larger than aid flows which are given in table 22.
22 However 
the CIS-11 average conceals the much greater importance of remittances for several 
of these economies. In particular, remittances appear to be extremely large and 
important for six of the CIS; these being, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Remittances also are significant for Azerbaijan at between 
4 to 7 per cent of GDP, but given its large FDI inflows and trade surplus, the 
economic significance of remittances is less important. With the possible exception of 
Georgia, remittances are by far the largest financial inflow for these six economies, 
even larger than the aid flows to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan which averaged over 10 
per cent of GDP.   
                                                 
22 Russia has a negative value for aid in table 21 because of significant debt forgiveness it provided, 
especially in 2005; EU transfers are considered as aid in table 21. 
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Table 22 
Official Development Aid, 2001-2005 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Armenia .............................................  198    293    249    254    193  
Azerbaijan .........................................  232    349    301    176    223  
Belarus .............................................. 39   39   45   46    54  
Georgia ..............................................  300    313    226    314    310  
Kazakhstan .......................................  148    188    270    268    229  
Kyrgyzstan ........................................  189    186    200    261    268  
Republic of Moldova .........................  122    142    118    120    192  
Tajikistan ...........................................  169    168    148    243    241  
Turkmenistan.....................................  72    41    27    37    28  
Ukraine .............................................. 519   483   323   358    410  
Uzbelkistan.........................................  153    189    195    246    172  
     Source:  OECD. 
 
All these economies, except Uzbekistan, have been running trade deficits of 
well over 10 per cent of GDP and this has represented a real transfer of goods and 
services to these economies which has allowed them to direct additional resources to 
poverty alleviation and to investment activities promoting their longer-run economic 
development. For all of these, except perhaps Georgia, remittance inflows have been 
at a magnitude sufficient to finance most of this resource transfer. It should also be 
pointed out that for several of these economies, remittance inflows are generally of 
the magnitude of exports. The opportunity costs of producing these exports are 
significant while that of supplying labor (and earning remittances) is much less 
especially given the unemployment or underemployment which exists in most of 
these economies. Nevertheless, the magnitude and dynamism of remittances pose 
many policy questions, which generally underline the need for appropriate conditions 




In addition to their magnitude, remittances are important in that they are less 
volatile than capital inflows. This relatively more stable nature of workers’ 
remittances implies that they can act as a cushion in times of financial instability or 
crisis and reduce the impact of economic slowdowns. On the downside, remittances 
can negatively impact the recipient economy by transmitting unfavourable changes in 
the economic performance of host countries. In the CIS, the impact of a severe 
economic slowdown in Russia will be transmitted to other smaller economies in the 
subregion not only through the trade channel but also through reduced remittances. 
Finally, remittances can also create short-term macroeconomic management 
problems. An appreciation of the national currency, which will occur with sizable 
remittances, may damage the competitiveness of the traded goods sectors. To some 
degree this effect can be offset by intervention and sterilization by the monetary 
authorities. However, this can be costly and is not always possible especially for the 
very large flows coming into some of the CIS. In some of the small CIS economies, 
                                                 
23 While there has been a positive reappraisal of the role of remittances as a source of financing, there 
are also drawbacks. Migration of skilled workers may deplete the human capital base of the country 
while raising the cost of providing services by highly qualified and mobile professionals. (Sachs, 
2005). Moreover, migrants may be forced to endure harsh working conditions and possible 
discrimination due to lack of protection. This is particularly the case when they have an irregular status 
and work in the shadow economy. 
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large remittances inflows in an economic and institutional context in which 
sterilization tools are quite limited. 
 
The vast majority of funds sent home are used for consumption purposes and 
this has typically played a significant role in reducing poverty. To the degree that 
these funds are used to support education by paying fees or reducing child labor, these 
transfers may contribute to human capital investment in the economy. Improvements 
in diet and access to medical services can also upgrade the stock of human capital. 
There is increasing attention in the developmental literature about policy initiatives 
which can channel remittances into supposedly more productive activities. However, 
given the fairly low income of these workers and their families, it is not clear that a 
reduction in their consumption levels in order to further enhance other types of 
investment would be optimal for the maximization of social welfare over time. It must 
be recognized that remittances are private flows and public policy should focus 
primarily on increasing the alternative uses available and lowering their costs so that 
families using their own preferences can maximize their utility over time. 
 
The level of development of the financial sector has a direct bearing on the 
flow of remittances and its potential impact on the recipient economy. The prospects 
of high transfer costs negatively affect the decision to send funds home as these costs 
effectively diminish the amount that is received. In other words, inefficiency of the 
domestic financial sector acts as a tax on these financial flows. Therefore, progress in 
making domestic financial systems more competitive could serve to increase both the 
total amount of transfers and the share that circulates through formal channels, in 
effect raising the pool of resources available for future lending. In this way 
remittances could make a positive contribution to the growth of the capital stock 
either through its impact on widening the deposit base of the banking system or 
directly through financing business investments. The formal infrastructure to channel 
remittances in the CIS is undergoing rapid transformation, spurred by the large 
amounts being transferred, the number of operators active in this business segment 
and the growing level of competition (Quillin et al., 2007). International experience 
provides a number of policy schemes that seek to channel remittances to specific uses, 
attracted on the basis of low or zero transfer fees and perhaps tax advantages aiming 
at investment in social and business projects. Governance issues should be addressed 
firmly before such projects are undertaken. Strengthening the financial system would 
appear to be a priority task to create the necessary framework conditions. A possible 
extension of this institutional development would be involvement of microfinance 
institutions in the remittance transfer process and the provision of financial services to 
recipients although this may require significant regulatory changes.
24
 
There are also other tangible and intangible benefits of remittance flows across 
borders. A steady flow of remittances often makes a positive contribution to the 
investment climate, spurring institutional development and easing financing 
constraints.
25
  Migrant transfers can underpin credit ratings, which serve to attract 
other financial inflows. Remittances are just one of the channels through which 
                                                 
24 A thorough discussion of various experiences in this area and the various policy dilemmas is 
undertaken Johnson and Sedaca (2004). 
25 However, if remittances largely support consumption, they are less likely to affect or to be affected 
by the investment climate. 
  44migrants strengthen integration of the host and recipient economies. Well-established 
communities abroad (diasporas) can also be a source of investment. Broadly speaking, 
migrants reduce the information costs incurred in developing economic relations 
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1. Balance of payments data 
 
Data on migrant remittances have been routinely provided by the Central Bank of 
Russia as part of its balance of payment releases. Quarterly and annual data are 
available, with a breakdown between CIS and non-CIS countries. Total remittances 
can be obtained as the sum of compensation of employees (non-residents) and current 
and capital transfers by migrants (residents). 
 
(See balance of payment excel file for quarterly and annual data)
 
 
In addition to the balance of payment data, the CBR has started more recently to 
provide additional information, sometimes with a national breakdown of the origin 
and sources of flow, on cross-border individual payments. It is important to note that 
the coverage of these flows does not correspond with the definition of migrant 
remittances. 
 
2. Cross-border operations by physical persons (residents and non-residents) 
 
This covers all type of payments between physical persons through the banking 
system, postal offices and money transfer companies. A distinction between CIS and 
non-CIS is also made.  
 
(See cross-border operations, total)
 
A country quarterly breakdown is available since 2006QII.  
 
(See total cross-border individual payments by country)
 
This presentation includes not only items that should be considered remittances, such 
as compensation of employees and transfers but also payments for goods and services.  
For residents only, a breakdown of operations by finality is available (payment of 
goods, services, wages, transfers, self-payments, other). 
 
(See total cross-border by individual residents by type)
 
There are two other important differences with remittances: 
a.  It includes only actual flows. There is no allowance for unrecorded 
transactions. Only that part of the compensation of employees that is 
transferred abroad through the banking system or other organisations is 
included. Part of the compensation of employees, as recorded in the 
balance of payments, may not be transferred to the country of origin 
but used to pay for food and accommodations (recorded as exports). 
  48b.  It does not include non-cash transactions, i.e. there is no estimation for 




3. Cross-border payments through postal offices and money transfers companies. 
 
This records actual operations but excluding those that take place through the banking 
system. As usual, a distinction between CIS and non-CIS transaction is made. 
Includes money transfers by the following services: Anelik, BLIZKO, Contact, 
InterExpress, Migom, MoneyGram, PrivatMoney, Travelex Worldwide Money Ltd, 
UNIStream, Western Union, AsiaExpress, Allur, Bistraya Pochta, GutaSprint, 
Zolotaya Korona, LIDER. 
 
 
(See cross-border payments through postal offices and money transfer companies) 
 
A country quarterly breakdown is available since 2006QII. The limitations discussed 
above regarding its relations with the concept of migrant remittances also apply. 
 
 
(See cross-border payments through postal offices and money transfers companies by 
country)
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Appendix II 
Russian Data on Cross-Border Financial Flows 
Individual’s 
purchase of goods 




















spent or taxed 
locally 
Cross-border payments through 
post and transfer services 
Remittances 
Cross-border payments 
Migrant compensation spent 
or taxed locally 
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Appendix III-A 
Remittances to Ukraine by Component on a Bilateral Basis 2004-2006 
 2004  years  2005 years 2006  years 
Compensation of employees 216,782.0  358,934.3  540,143.5 
     including:       
         CIS countries  4,992.5  7,755.6  9,103.2 
Russian Federation  4,471.5  6,367.9  8,076.0 
Kazakhstan 119.2  246.9  353.5 
Belarus 36.8  337.1  155.3 
Armenia 125.5  165.6  152.3 
Kirgizstan 42.1  413.5  121.9 
Georgia 52.6  109.5  104.8 
Moldova 85.7  62.5  69.0 
Azerbaijan 34.8  48.6  61.3 
Uzbekistan 11.1  0.0  4.6 
Turkmenistan 12.6  3.9  4.0 
Tadjikistan 0.7  0.0  0.5 
          Rest of the world  211,789.5  351,178.7  531,040.3 
Greece 47,823.5  76,646.7  93,099.7 
Great Britain  32,312.2  43,102.4  79,918.3 
Cyprus 33,167.0  49,387.4  68,260.7 
USA 19,026.9  36,645.1  65,618.4 
Germany 19,851.5  35,693.3  51,137.1 
Switzerland 8,766.2  20,831.1  25,097.0 
Latvia 10,152.4  15,159.3  24,579.9 
United Arab Emirates  3,549.6  7,411.4  13,859.3 
Netherlands 3,881.1  6,790.6  10,695.9 
Panama 534.3  4,595.3  10,192.5 
Singapore 2,800.7  4,678.0  8,537.1 
Belgium 2,613.0  5,266.5  6,752.1 
Italy 1 ,800.5  2,802.7  5,583.3 
China 2,225.2  3,507.4  4,757.7 
Norway 1 ,398.9  2,546.5  4,607.7 
            other   21,886.6  36,115.0  58,343.7 
Workers' remittances  192,525.1  236,675.6  289,546.8 
     including:       
         CIS countries  36,473.7  37,912.8  65,892.0 
Russian Federation  35,600.4  35,813.4  59,089.0 
Kazakhstan 472.1  821.8  6,286.5 
Georgia 72.0  17.3  141.0 
Kirgizstan 5.1  52.1  90.2 
Moldova 15.3  75.5  82.1 
Belarus 137.1  1,053.5  61.6 
Uzbekistan 32.1  19.1  60.4 
Azerbaijan 47.4  33.6  31.5 
Tadjikistan 2.0  10.0  25.8 
Turkmenistan 26.3  3.7  20.9 
Armenia 64.1  12.7  3.0 
          Rest of the world  156,051.4  198,762.9  223,654.8 
USA 13,420.9  24,353.4  45,665.0 
Italy 18,057.8  26,941.1  31,532.3 
Portugal 30,596.2  39,799.0  26,726.2 
Spain 15,925.8  24,340.5  23,022.7 
Greece 16,974.0  12,159.3  13,554.7 
Switzerland 4,898.0  6,274.0  12,565.1 
Germany 6 ,968.7  11,561.2  11,507.2 
Great Britain  8,602.3  11,156.0  11,140.4 
Cyprus 13,790.0  5,158.0  6,617.0 
Ireland 3,893.7  5,932.6  5,092.6 
Denmark 1,402.8  2,186.3  3,597.5 
Latvia 1,393.6  2,355.5  3,466.8 
Canada 717.4  1,770.1  2,711.0 
United Arab Emirates  1,287.4  1,734.8  2,352.8 
Japan 2,545.1  2,490.7  2,126.1 
            other   15,577.5  20,550.3  21,977.5 
Migrants' transfers  94.5  184.8  93.0 
     including:       
          Russian Federation  94.5  179.8  65.1 
          Rest of the world  0.0  5.0  27.8 
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Appendix III-B 
Remittances from Ukraine by Component on a Bilateral Basis 2004-2006 
   2004  2005   2006 
Compensation of employees  5,250.8  10,056.6  9,679.5 
     including:       
         CIS countries  2,505.9  3,775.4  3,595.8 
Russian Federation  855.6  1,912.6  2,266.9 
Turkmenistan 1,387.2  1,155.8  327.7 
Belarus 92.6  166.1  314.1 
Kazakhstan 4.8  38.0  154.3 
Uzbekistan 10.1  41.1  141.6 
Georgia 37.0  188.1  139.3 
Armenia 70.6  100.6  120.1 
Moldova 33.4  150.8  88.8 
Azerbaijan 14.6  20.2  41.5 
Kirgizstan 0.0  2.3  1.6 
          Rest of the world  2,744.9  6,281.3  6,083.7 
USA 1,304.6  2,492.0  1,171.3 
Germany 50.2  461.5  598.3 
France 48.1  242.5  539.2 
Netherlands 45.5  617.3  430.1 
Great Britain  24.8  501.4  338.9 
Argentina 56.7  304.7  272.1 
Italy 0.0  51.5  203.1 
Poland 394.2  162.7  189.5 
Yugoslavia 0.0  0.0  153.1 
Tunis 214.2  88.8  150.8 
Estonia 10.6  87.4  147.3 
Switzerland 0.0  15.6  140.5 
Belgium 5.0  27.3  137.5 
Austria 126.5  114.1  134.6 
Uruguay 0.0  37.7  132.5 
            other   464.6  1,076.7  1,344.8 
       
Workers' remittances  333.5  2,428.1  2,473.2 
     including:       
         CIS countries  98.7  262.5  415.2 
Russian Federation  96.9  254.7  413.2 
Belarus 0.0  0.7  1.0 
Georgia 0.8  7.1  1.0 
Kazakhstan 1.0  0.0  0.0 
          Rest of the world  234.8  2,165.6  2,058.1 
USA 8.6  741.1  454.3 
Great Britain  1.0  140.2  291.2 
Denmark 2.0  252.9  233.7 
Austria 0.0  0.0  149.3 
Netherlands 0.0  7.8  130.1 
Argentina 0.0  19.1  123.9 
Germany 42.4  273.2  122.1 
Italy 0.0  22.5  83.2 
Latvia 3.5  3.0  65.4 
Australia 1.0  0.0  61.0 
Israel 8.7  60.0  54.9 
Uruguay 0.0  4.2  53.8 
France 3.1  3.2  41.8 
Poland 25.7  116.1  37.4 
Canada 0.0  25.4  36.0 
            other   138.8  496.9  119.9 
  52Migrants' transfers  14,173.3  22,125.0  20,099.7 
     including:       
         CIS countries  7,615.7  10,030.6  13,706.5 
Russian Federation  7,309.3  9,415.2  12,934.3 
Belarus 196.4  451.1  685.8 
Kazakhstan 34.6  140.4  53.4 
Moldova 26.0  5.6  26.0 
Uzbekistan 17.0  8.4  7.0 
Georgia 23.5  10.0  0.0 
Azerbaijan 8.8  0.0  0.0 
          Rest of the world  6,557.6  12,094.3  6,393.3 
USA 2,425.6  1,832.2  1,966.4 
Israel 897.8  1,054.1  1,495.4 
Canada 1,381.5  1,025.9  778.2 
Germany 991.7  4,181.9  583.8 
Austria 141.5  650.0  351.5 
Czech Republic  40.3  83.0  317.3 
Poland 20.2  100.6  165.0 
Australia 99.9  487.2  155.5 
Bulgaria 6.4  0.0  105.6 
New Zeland  142.8  1.6  84.8 
Finland 0.0  550.2  78.3 
Hungary 0.0  0.0  68.7 
Greece 1.0  30.0  43.2 
Romania 0.0  0.0  41.0 
Lithuania 0.0  27.9  41.0 
            other   408.9  2,069.7  117.6 
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